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Most U.S. corporations do not pay federal income taxes.1 In
fact, domestic corporations have become so adept at reducing
their tax bills that they accounted for less than 10 percent of all
income taxes collected by the federal government from 2000
through 2003.2 One might be surprised to discover, then, that
during the last several years some corporations have been willing to report, and pay over to the Treasury, hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes that they did not owe. Why? Because
paying the tax helped conceal the fact that those companies
were playing with Monopoly money—fabricating profits as
phony as the bright pastel-colored money used in the classic
Parker Brothers board game.3 This corporate malfeasance apparently continues to occur with some frequency. Of course,
when the game was over, those same companies wanted to raid
the “community chest” to get their money back by filing taxrefund claims. The problem with permitting such claims is that
reporting phony income is as much a tax fraud as is failing to
report real income.4 The only difference is that the latter is subject to significant penalties, while the former is only nominally
1. From 1996 through 2000, 61 percent of U.S.-controlled corporations
reported no U.S. tax liability. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO.
GAO-04-358, COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGNAND U.S.-CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, 1996–2000 2 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04358.pdf. Seventy-one percent of U.S.controlled foreign corporations also reported no U.S. tax liability. Id.
2. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEP’T, TREASURY DEPARTMENT
GROSS TAX COLLECTIONS: AMOUNT COLLECTED BY QUARTER AND FISCAL
YEAR, 1987–2004 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
04tc18fy.xls; see also ROBERT S. MCINTYRE & T.D. COO NGUYEN, CORPORATE
INCOME TAXES IN THE BUSH YEARS 13 (2004), available at
http://www.ctj.org/corpfed04an.pdf; David Cay Johnston, Tax Inquiries Fall as
Cheating Increases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, at A16.
3. See Merle Erickson, How Much Are Nonexistent Earnings Worth?,
CAPITAL IDEAS, Spring 2003, http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/news/capideas/
spring03/nonexistentearnings.html (discussing willingness of corporate managers to pay additional taxes in furtherance of fraudulent earnings inflation).
4. See infra note 23.
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penalized under current rules.5 This Article argues that because of the potentially corrosive effect that false reporting has
on the tax system, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should
remedy the deficiency of current rules by revisiting principles
of equity to deny refunds of taxes paid on fraudulently inflated
income.
Since the implosion of Enron in November of 2001, Wall
Street has been severely shaken by an unprecedented string of
accounting fraud scandals involving publicly traded corporations.6 Most of the corporations involved have been guilty of
earnings inflation—adding fictitious income to their financial
statements. The appeal of earnings inflation is obvious. By
means of various accounting gimmicks, or by simply manufacturing transactions that never took place, a company can create
a steadily rising earnings curve that will boost its share price.7
Not surprisingly, this produces lucrative rewards for management. Stock option grants to management frequently are tied to
specified earnings targets that may be achieved more quickly
by manipulating the company’s books.8 Moreover, as share
prices rise based on increases in revenue and profit, management may realize ever-greater gains from sales of previously
acquired shares of the company.9
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. More than fifty major publicly traded corporations were under investigation for accounting fraud and other financial misdeeds in 2002 alone. See
Gary Stoller, Funny Numbers, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2002, at B3.
7. See David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
890, 892–99 (2002) (discussing investor willingness to pay a “predictability
premium” for the shares of companies reporting continuous earnings increases
and the resulting “single-minded focus on boosting stock prices through shortterm earnings performance [that] has become standard operating procedure at
most . . . publicly traded corporations”).
8. See id. at 906 (“A . . . likely explanation for [share price maximization]
looks . . . to management’s own self-interest . . . . It is now widely assumed
that executives’ current obsession with quarterly earnings and their effect on
stock prices is connected to the dramatic increase in compensation by means of
stock options.”).
9. For example, from 1999 to 2001, Qwest Communications executives
reaped more than $500 million from stock sales while shares were trading in
the $40 range. David Leonhardt, Qwest Leaders Made Millions in Stock Sales,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2002, at C1. Of that amount, $227 million was made by
one former CEO alone. Id. By mid-2002, however, Qwest had confessed to inflating earnings and its stock was trading at less than $1.50 per share. Id.
Similarly, HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy exercised more than $201 million in stock options in the six years that the company inflated its earnings.
Closing Arguments Wind Up at Scrushy Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at
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But as the accounting scandals have unraveled, dozens of
public companies have been forced to restate their earnings,
and in some cases file for bankruptcy protection.10 Congress responded to these financial accounting abuses by passing the
sweeping Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,11 which was intended to
strengthen the oversight of accountants, increase corporate responsibility, and enhance the ability of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to detect and investigate accounting
fraud.12 However, a company deceiving shareholders about its
earnings generally must deceive the tax collector as well as the
securities regulator.
Although they are not compelled to do so, corporations that
inflate their earnings often pay tax on the fictitious income
they create because doing so helps to hide the accounting fraud
from investors, analysts and the SEC.13 If the fraud goes undetected, an offending corporation almost certainly will be content
to allow the government to keep the tax overpayments.14 When
the fraud is exposed, however, the corporation is likely to respond by seeking a refund of the overpaid taxes, which may
amount to tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars.15 WorldC3.
10. See James Toedtman, Scandal Scorecard, NEWSDAY, July 13, 2004,
http://www.newsday.com/business/ny-scandal-scorecard%2C0%2C4119732
.story?coll=ny-business-utility.
11. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
12. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-610 passim (2002) (Conf. Rep.). In addition to
the congressional response, the SEC—charged with protecting investors and
maintaining the integrity of the securities markets—stepped up enforcement
activity, seeking criminal penalties against dozens of officers and employees of
offending companies, imposing penalties totaling roughly $1.48 billion, and
ordering disgorgement of approximately $3.77 billion in ill-gotten gains in fiscal years 1999 through 2003. SEC ANN. REP. 15 (2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep01/ar01full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1 (2000),
available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep00/ar00full.pdf; SEC ANN. REP. 1
(1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep99/ar99full.pdf. Of the penalties imposed during those five years, over $1 billion was levied in fiscal year
2003 alone. SEC ANN. REP. 15 (2003).
13. See Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Wins Senate Approval of Corporate Crackdown Measure (May 15, 2003), http://grassley
.senate.gov/index.cfm (search for “Corporate Crackdown”; then follow the resulting hyperlink) (“The con men pay a little tax to help hide their fraud,
bump up the price and cash in their stock options.”).
14. See Erickson, supra note 3.
15. See Rebecca Blumenstein et al., After Inflating Their Income, Companies Want IRS Refunds, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2003, at A1; Anitha Reddy &
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Com,16 for example, which created $11 billion in phony income
through various accounting schemes,17 reportedly already has
collected nearly $300 million in tax refunds.18 Qwest Communications International Inc., HealthSouth and Enron also reportedly considered or are considering filing refund claims for overpayments of income tax in similar circumstances.19 Information
on refund claims is difficult to obtain owing to the confidentiality of federal income tax returns,20 but given the breadth of the
earnings-inflation problem there are likely dozens of other corporations seeking refunds as a result of fraudulently overstated
income.
Perhaps such claims are appropriate. After all, a corporation that inflates its taxable income clearly pays more federal
income tax than it owes.21 Importantly for the company, a refund of the tax paid also provides an infusion of cash that may
be used to mitigate the damage to creditors or shareholders
caused by the underlying accounting fraud.22 Of course, if a tax
refund were permitted in these circumstances, the tax rules
should at least exact a hefty penalty in order to deter future
Christopher Stern, Firms Want Refunds of Tax on Fake Profit, WASH. POST,
May 3, 2003, at E1.
16. In connection with its emergence from bankruptcy, WorldCom
changed its brand name to MCI. Press Release, WorldCom, Inc., WorldCom
Files Plan of Reorganization and Changes Brand Name to MCI (Apr. 14,
2003), http://global.mci.com/about/news/releases/2003/ (follow the corresponding hyperlink under “14 April, 2003”).
17. Shawn Young, MCI to State Fraud Was $11 Billion, WALL ST. J., Mar.
12, 2004, at A3.
18. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15. The $300 million reportedly collected by WorldCom is nearly as much as the total amount paid in federal tax
refunds to all corporations in the State of Oregon in 2003. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEP’T, PUBL’N NO. 55B, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 2003 DATA BOOK 15 tbl.8, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/
pub/irs-soi/03db08rf.xls.
19. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15. Enron reportedly paid no income tax in four of the five years from 1996 through 2000. See David Cay
Johnston, Enron Avoided Income Taxes in 4 of 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2002, at A1; CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, LESS THAN ZERO: ENRON’S CORPORATE TAX PAYMENTS 1996–2000 1 (2002), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/enron.pdf.
20. The Internal Revenue Code prohibits officers and employees of the
United States from disclosing any return or “return information.” I.R.C.
§ 6103(a) (2000). Return information is defined as “any tax or information return . . . or claim for refund” (emphasis added). Id. § 6103(b).
21. HealthSouth spokesman Andy Brimmer noted, “Logically, if we overpaid taxes on income we didn’t have, we may seek a refund.” Blumenstein et
al., supra note 15.
22. But see infra Part III.D.2 for a discussion of the “innocent investor.”
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use of the tax system to conceal accounting fraud. Unfortunately, the rules do no such thing. Because the relevant penalty
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code apply to underpayments rather than overpayments of income tax, a corporation
guilty of this kind of fraud might pay no more than a few thousand dollars in fines. One way to more adequately penalize the
tax fraud committed in earnings-inflation cases would be to
withhold the related tax refund.23
23. At this point it may be helpful to clarify a critical point regarding terminology. Can a taxpayer commit “tax fraud” by paying too much tax to the
Treasury? As it turns out, the answer is that it is indeed possible, for several
reasons. First, in simplest terms, fraud means deception. See Frowen v. Blank,
425 A.2d 412, 415 (Pa. 1981) (“A fraud consists in anything calculated to deceive, whether by single act or combination, or by suppression of truth, or a
suggestion of what is false, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo,
by speech or silence, word of mouth, or look or gesture.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that fraud is synonymous with bad faith,
dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, and unfairness). Tax fraud is
therefore deception with respect to one’s tax liability. This is the sense in
which the term is used in I.R.C. § 7206(1), which is under the title “Fraud and
False Statements” and simply prohibits the willful filing of a false tax return.
I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000). No monetary loss to the government or underpayment
of tax is necessary for a conviction under this statute. See infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
Second, fraud commonly is understood to mean deception resulting in loss
to another. See Gibbons v. Brandt, 170 F.2d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 1947) (“Fraud in
its generic sense, especially as the word is used in courts of equity, comprises
all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty and resulting in damage to another.”) (emphasis added); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra, at 660 (defining fraud to also include perversion of truth
causing one to “part with some valuable thing”). However, the loss involved
need not be monetary. It may consist of the surrender of a legal right, the infliction of a legal injury or some form of detrimental reliance resulting in damage. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 660. Thus, as will be shown, a
violation of § 7206(1) is also fraud under this more limited definition of the
term. See infra notes 106–21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
detriment to the U.S. government caused by a violation of § 7206(1).
Third, § 7206(1) and the crime most frequently associated with the notion
of tax fraud—tax evasion under I.R.C. § 7201—were originally part of the
same statute. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000). The Income Tax Law of 1913 stated that
one “who makes any false or fraudulent return . . . with intent to defeat or
evade the assessment required by this section . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(F), 38 Stat. 114, 171 (1913) (emphasis added).
This unitary provision was bifurcated in the War Revenue Act of 1917 (without any explanation in the legislative history), resulting in one provision proscribing the making of a false or fraudulent return (the predecessor to
§ 7206(1)) and the other proscribing the evasion or attempted evasion of tax
(the predecessor to § 7201). See War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1209,
40 Stat. 300, 336 (1917). Thus, it is reasonable to refer to the activity currently
prohibited under § 7206(1) in its present form as “tax fraud” and to the activity prohibited under § 7201 as “tax evasion.” For additional detail on the evo-
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Recognizing that companies that inflate their taxable income make the IRS “an unwitting accomplice to . . . fraud,”24
the Senate, in May 2003, approved a measure that would have
increased the penalty for tax fraud to an amount equal to the
overpayment of tax attributable to the fraud.25 The effect of this
provision would have been to disallow any refunds of taxes paid
on fraudulently inflated income.26 Unfortunately, the measure
was dropped in the conference committee27 and did not become
part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ultimately
signed by President George W. Bush in October 2004.28 However, this Article suggests that the IRS may be able to achieve
the results intended by the omitted Senate provision through
lution of §§ 7201 and 7206(1), see Ronald H. Jensen, Reflections on United
States v. Leona Helmsely: Should “Impossibility” Be a Defense to Attempted
Income Tax Evasion?, 12 VA. TAX REV. 335, 346–48 (1993).
Finally, violations of § 7206(1) are described by the IRS as “Fraudulent
Activities” and are investigated and prosecuted by the IRS Criminal Investigation Division’s “General Tax Fraud Program.” See Internal Revenue Service
Criminal Investigation, General Tax Fraud Program, http://www.ustreas.gov/
irs/ci/tax_fraud/docgeneraltaxfraud.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
24. Press Release, supra note 13.
25. S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 425 (2004); see Rob Wells, Tax Plan Takes
Shape: Lawmakers Move to Halt Refunds on False Earnings, WALL ST. J., May
16, 2003, at A2.
26. The bill would have amended § 7206 to provide:
If any portion of any underpayment (as defined in section 6664(a)) or
overpayment (as defined in section 6401(a)) of tax required to be
shown on a return is attributable to fraudulent action described in
subsection (a), the applicable [penalty] under subsection (a) shall in
no event be less than an amount equal to such portion.
S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 425 (as passed by Senate, May 11, 2004) (emphasis
added). The provision subsequently was made an amendment to the Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, H.R. 4520, 108th Cong. § 425 (engrossed amendment as agreed to by Senate, July 15, 2004). Had it been
adopted, the efficacy of the provision as worded is somewhat doubtful because
§ 6401 does not define the term “overpayment.” I.R.C. § 6401 (2000). It merely
states that an overpayment includes amounts assessed or collected from the
taxpayer after the expiration of the statute of limitations for such assessment
or collection. Id.
27. Although the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108357, 118 Stat. 1418, includes some provisions aimed at curbing corporate tax
shelters and corporate tax avoidance in general, many more such provisions
were dropped. Compare S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 425 (as reported in Senate,
Nov. 7, 2003) with H.R. 4520, 108th Cong., §§ 811–822 (as passed by House,
Oct. 7, 2004, and Senate, Oct. 11, 2004).
28. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. The measure resurfaced in a
highway funding bill passed by the Senate on May 17, 2005, but was again
dropped in final legislation. Compare H.R. 3, 109th Cong. § 5503 (as passed by
Senate, May 17, 2005) with Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-059 (2005).
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the rules of equity.29 Moreover, equity may well furnish a more
sound approach to penalizing offenders in such cases than
would a legislative enactment.30
Central to the thesis of this Article is the fact that taxrefund suits are in essence claims in equity, a proposition that
has two important implications. First, the taxpayer filing a taxrefund suit is asking the court to impose a fair, just, and equitable “remedy”—namely, the refund of taxes paid in excess of
what was due. As an equity claimant, the taxpayer is not in a
position to demand that the refund be granted.31 Second, the
fact that refund suits are actions in equity means that claimants are subject to well-established equitable defenses like the
doctrine of unclean hands.32 Based on these twin propositions,
this Article asserts that the IRS not only may, but should, assert equitable defenses to deny refunds of taxes paid on fraudulently inflated earnings.
Part I of the Article begins with an examination of how a
company actually inflates its earnings based on the example of
prominent offender WorldCom, and then addresses the relationship between accounting, or “book,” income and tax income.
This part of the Article also assesses the breadth of the earnings-inflation problem and analyzes the potential harm that inflation of taxable income may inflict on the federal tax system.
Part II examines the current criminal and civil provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code that govern tax fraud related to
earnings inflation and discusses the elements of those offenses.
The element of materiality is particularly critical because it
29. See generally Craig M. Boise, Tax Fraud and Inflated Corporate Earnings: Is There an Alternative to the Legislative Fix?, 106 TAX NOTES 191 (2005).
Although the Senate legislation failed to receive the support of the full Congress, this does not suggest that the courts may not, or should not, attempt to
achieve the results contemplated by that legislation within the sphere of their
jurisdiction, particularly when doing so is consistent with what one scholar
has termed the “theoretical construct that overarches the sum total of the entire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to be captured by it.” Deborah A.
Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492,
497 (1995).
30. See infra Part III.D.
31. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion:
The Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 614 (1997) (“[P]arties
who have placed their case within the category of cases traditionally qualifying for equitable relief were not automatically entitled to it. Parties could not
demand equitable relief; to the contrary, they always requested it.”).
32. The doctrine of unclean hands derives from the general equitable admonition that “those who seek equity must themselves do equity.” See G.W.
KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 87–117 (6th ed. 1965).
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addresses the question of whether overstating income for tax
purposes (as opposed to understating it) causes any cognizable
harm to the government that ought to be penalized. This portion of the Article concludes that the government is harmed by
tax fraud, that the penalty provisions for the offense generally
are not sufficiently robust, and that they are particularly inadequate in dealing with earnings inflation. It also describes
the tax-refund process and the relative ease with which companies may obtain refunds, even where the excess taxes were paid
to mask fraudulent earnings. Part II closes with the observation that a company is entitled to receive interest on overpayments of tax, which further rewards use of the tax system to
disguise accounting fraud.
Part III of the Article explores the relationship between
fraud-related refund claims and equity. To provide support for
the application of equity as proposed in Part IV of the Article,
Part III first reviews the history of equity and its relationship
to tax-refund suits to establish that equity is an appropriate
vehicle for evaluating tax-refund claims. It then discusses the
various equitable defenses that apply in equity cases, how
those defenses might be asserted by the IRS against a taxrefund claim like WorldCom’s, and the related public policy implications of asserting such defenses. Finally, Part IV of the Article discusses how, as a matter of process, the IRS may use a
recent change to a corporate income tax return schedule to
identify fraud-related refund claims and how the congressional
Joint Committee on Taxation might utilize its powers to review
large refund claims.
I. THE PROBLEM OF EARNINGS INFLATION
A. FINANCIAL REPORTING
WorldCom is a stunning example of an apparently healthy
company secretly manipulating its books to create nonexistent
earnings and thus increase its stock price.33 In August of 1998,
33. A trade group of CEOs convened a commission to analyze the corporate scandals of the past several years and the subsequent decline of public
and investor trust in the capital markets. THE CONFERENCE BD. COMM’N ON
PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2002),
available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/SR-03-04.pdf. The commission concluded that attempts by corporate managers to manipulate company stock price were largely attributable to excessive use of stock options and
other forms of equity-based incentive compensation. Id. at 5–6.
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WorldCom appeared phenomenally successful. In that month,
the company completed a $6.1 billion bond offering, the largest
corporate bond issue in history.34 The funds it raised helped to
pay for its acquisition of MCI earlier that year.35 Through a
string of more than seventy acquisitions, capped by the MCI
merger, a company that had begun as a humble reseller of longdistance telephone services for hotels in Mississippi36 had
grown to become the nation’s second-largest long-distance
provider with some twenty million residential customers and
thousands of corporate accounts.37 WorldCom’s extensive global
network facilities covered six continents and reached every major city in the world through more than 90,000 miles of landbased and undersea fiber-optic cable.38 Virtually every major
investor felt the need to have WorldCom in its portfolio and
there was an expectation in some quarters that the company’s
mega-bond deal would lift the entire corporate bond market.39
But WorldCom’s apparent success masked grave financial
troubles that mounted in the next few years. The explosive
growth that had driven the company’s extraordinary earnings
trajectory had come with a high price tag. By 2002, the company had accumulated over $40 billion in debt,40 which it
struggled to service as a general downturn in the telecommunications industry reduced revenue and produced a $2 trillion
loss in the value of telecommunications stocks.41 Moreover, poor
management of companies that WorldCom acquired meant that

34. Gregory Zuckerman, WorldCom Makes History with $6.1 Billion Sale
of Eagerly Awaited, Strongly Demanded Bonds, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1998, at
C15.
35. Id.
36. See First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 11–13, In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-15533 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
2002),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/
thornburgh1strpt.pdf [hereinafter WorldCom First Report].
37. See Shawn Young et al., WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2002, at A3.
38. Indictment at 2–3, United States v. Ebbers, Case No. S3 02 Cr. 1144
(BSJ) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004).
39. Zuckerman, supra note 34.
40. RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S.
RAKOFF 20 (2003), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rulings/
02cv4963_082603.pdf.
41. See Simon Romero & Jonathan D. Glater, Bankruptcy’s Taut Wiring,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A1.
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anticipated efficiencies were not realized, and, as a result, the
company’s overhead costs soared.42
A large part of WorldCom’s overhead consisted of costs associated with transmitting voice or data over communication
lines. These costs are known in the telecommunications industry as “line costs.” WorldCom accounted for its line costs by
creating reserves on its books reflecting anticipated payments,
and then releasing those reserves as bills were paid.43 An individual might do much the same thing by making an entry in
her check register for an electric bill that has not yet been paid,
thus reducing her checkbook balance by the amount of the bill.
Ultimately, the entry is reconciled when the check is written to
the utility company.
As its financial difficulties increased, WorldCom began to
boost its reported earnings by releasing its accrued line cost reserves before the line costs were paid, a move that violated
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).44 This practice would be similar to the individual deleting the checkbook
entry for her electric bill. Although the account balance reflected in the check register increases, the expense is still owed
and the register thus does not accurately reflect the individual’s financial position. By April 2001, WorldCom had released
all of its line cost reserves to shore up its earnings and a new
strategy was needed to boost revenue.45 It found such a strategy in altering the way it accounted for those same line costs.
Beginning in 2001, rather than continuing to treat line
costs as an expense that reduced its ever-dwindling income,
WorldCom began to capitalize those costs because the cost of
42. BREEDEN, supra note 40, at 20.
43. See WorldCom First Report, supra note 36, at 106–07.
44. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 2, 61–62
(2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/
000093176303001862/dex991.htm. Manipulation of reserves represents the
most common approach to earnings management. See Mark W. Nelson et al.,
How Are Earnings Managed? Examples from Auditors, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS
(SUPPLEMENT) 17, 22–23 (2003), (discussing an empirical study, which found
that 38 percent of attempts by companies to manage earnings involved reserve
transactions).
45. On a quarterly basis, WorldCom assessed the gap between actual and
target revenue, and then closed the gap through the use of various accounting
“opportunities” identified by the accounting groups. Third and Final Interim
Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 276, In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-15533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2003), available at
http://www.kl.com/files/tbl_s48News/PDFUpload307/10129/WorldCom_
Report_final.pdf [hereinafter WorldCom Third Report].
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capitalized items can be spread out over many years, thus reducing the immediate impact of the expense on income.46 One
commentator has likened this direct violation of GAAP to the
manager of an ice cream parlor pretending that operating expenses for things such as cream, sugar and chocolate syrup
really “are part of the purchase price of a new refrigerator.”47
Because capitalization made its line costs much lower, WorldCom’s income increased by almost $4 billion in the next two
years, insuring that the company would meet analysts’ profit
expectations and continue to experience surging share prices.48
This artificial income, along with another $2 billion or so in
false revenue entries and various improper accounting adjustments,49 helped prop up WorldCom through July 2002, when
the teetering edifice finally and spectacularly collapsed in
bankruptcy.50
B. TAX REPORTING
When WorldCom inflated the book income it reported to
shareholders in 1999 through the tactics just described, it created another problem—one that was tax-related. To illustrate,
assume for a moment that WorldCom was guilty only of improperly capitalizing line costs in 2001 (i.e., treating the ice
cream expenses as the cost of a refrigerator). By capitalizing
line costs rather than deducting them from income, WorldCom
reduced its expenses for 2001 by roughly $2.1 billion and thus
increased its income for that year by the same amount.51 Assuming for purposes of illustration that WorldCom had no
other earnings, the company could then have reported $2.1 billion of book income for 2001. If the company’s reported income

46. Id. at 278.
47. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING 114 (2003).
48. See WorldCom First Report, supra note 36, at 109 (describing the
manner in which WorldCom overstated its pre-tax income).
49. WorldCom was perpetrating accounting fraud in a number of ways
other than the methods described in this Article. See id. at 110–17.
50. When its fraud became public, WorldCom’s creditors declared the
company in default on various loan commitments. See Jared Sandberg et al.,
WorldCom to File Chapter 11, as Cash Reserves Dwindle Fast, WALL ST. J.,
July 19, 2002, at A1. As its sources of funding dried up, WorldCom ran out of
cash and was forced to file for bankruptcy protection. Id. As a result of WorldCom’s bankruptcy, over $200 billion in shareholder value was destroyed and
tens of thousands of WorldCom employees lost their jobs. See BREEDEN, supra
note 40, at 12 & n.1.
51. WorldCom Third Report, supra note 45, at 352–53.
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met or exceeded analysts’ expectations, the company likely
would see a boost in its stock price, thus accomplishing one of
management’s principal goals. The difficult question, however,
was how the company should treat that $2.1 billion of phony
book income for federal income tax purposes.
WorldCom had at least two choices. First, the company
simply could have omitted the phantom income from its 2001
tax return. Had it done so, WorldCom’s taxable income would
have been $0 and the company would have paid no federal income tax.52 However, this would have created a $2.1 billion gap
between WorldCom’s reported book income ($2.1 billion) on the
one hand, and its taxable income ($0), on the other.53 WorldCom would have had to reconcile this book-tax difference on
Schedule M-1 of its federal income tax return.54 Given the size
of the gap, the IRS might well have been alerted to WorldCom’s
accounting fraud.55 Further, to analysts who closely followed
the company, such a sizeable book-tax difference might have
suggested that WorldCom either was “managing” its earnings56
52. Under GAAP, WorldCom would have been required to record an additional deferred tax expense equal to the tax on $2.1 billion to account for the
expectation that income taxes ultimately would be paid on the reported book
income. Assuming a hypothetical effective tax rate of 20 percent, this would
have produced a deferred tax expense of $420 million. Some studies have indicated that there is a negative association between deferred taxes (represented
by the book-tax gap) and a company’s share returns. See, e.g., Paul K. Chaney
& Debra Jeter, The Effect of Deferred Taxes on Security Prices, 9 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 91, 114 (1994); Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J. Newberry, The Influence of Tax and Non-Tax Costs on Book-Tax Reporting Differences: Public and
Private Firms, 23 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1, 1 (2001).
53. In reality, failing to report the artificial income would have increased,
rather than created, a book-tax difference since WorldCom, like most companies, already would have had a book-tax difference. This difference occurs because income is calculated differently for financial accounting purposes than
for federal income tax purposes. See generally George A. Plesko, Corporate Tax
Avoidance and the Properties of Corporate Earnings, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 729
(2004) (describing the differences between the rules used to compute income
for financial and tax-reporting purposes).
54. In a variation on this approach, WorldCom could have shifted the artificial income to an offshore subsidiary in a low-tax jurisdiction, thus making
the book-tax difference permanent and avoiding the recognition of the deferred
tax liability described supra, note 52. See ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES—
SPECIAL AREAS, Opinion No. 23 (Accounting Principles Bd. 1972).
55. There is evidence that sizeable book-tax differences may attract IRS
scrutiny. See Lillian F. Mills, Book-Tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Adjustments, 36 J. ACCT. RES. 343, 345 (1998).
56. Management of earnings occurs “when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance
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or had low earnings quality.57 Intensified IRS scrutiny or a
market perception of earnings irregularities would have been
equally disastrous to a company that was concealing billions of
dollars of artificial income in the midst of an industry downturn, and these considerations may have resulted in WorldCom’s decision to report the phantom income.
Alternatively, WorldCom could have elected to report the
$2.1 billion of phantom book earnings as taxable income on its
income tax return. Because the fictitious book income ($2.1 billion) would match taxable income ($2.1 billion), this approach
would produce no book-tax difference to be reconciled on
Schedule M-1, thus greatly reducing the likelihood that WorldCom’s earnings inflation would be discovered.58 Of course, the
drawback would be the cash outlay necessary to pay taxes on
the income.59 Again, assuming WorldCom had no other earnings and was subject to a hypothetical effective tax rate of five
percent, the company would incur a tax liability of $105 million
on the phantom income.60
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported
accounting numbers.” Paul M. Healy & James M. Wahlen, A Review of the
Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting,
13 ACCT. HORIZONS 365, 368 (1999).
57. “Earnings quality” refers to the level of sustainability of a company’s
earnings. See Scott A. Richardson, Earnings Quality and Short Sellers, 17
ACCT. HORIZONS (SUPPLEMENT) 49, 49 (2003). Low-quality earnings could result from overvaluation of receivables, aggressive manipulation of reserves, or
inappropriate valuation of inventory, and are characterized by an increase in
current earnings without any corresponding increase in cash flows. Id.
58. WorldCom actually had a third alternative. It could have reported its
inflated earnings as additional gross income and then fabricated corresponding deductions to reduce or eliminate its taxable income. The result would
have been earnings inflation with no tax cost. However, creating $300 million
worth of phony deductions would have exposed the company to significant audit risk.
59. Responding to reports that Enron paid no federal income tax from
1996 through 2000, one scholar has noted that despite the inflated earnings on
its income statement, the company did not have any real income on which to
pay tax. See Victor Fleischer, Enron’s Dirty Little Secret: Waiting for the Other
Shoe to Drop, 94 TAX NOTES 1045, 1045 (2002). The lack of real income, however, was no impediment to paying income tax in other cases, such as that of
WorldCom.
60. Although the largest corporations pay tax at a maximum marginal
rate of 35 percent, in 2000, an estimated 94 percent of U.S. corporations filing
tax returns reported paying taxes of less than 5 percent of their income. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 2. WorldCom probably could
have utilized net operating loss (“NOL”) carryforwards or carrybacks to offset
at least some of the phantom taxable income and thus further reduce its tax
liability. In such circumstances, WorldCom would not be entitled to a refund,

BOISE_3FMT

158

11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:144

Of these two alternatives, WorldCom evidently chose the
latter, electing to report some or all of the fraudulent book income it created on its federal income tax returns and pay the
resulting income tax.61 WorldCom’s situation illustrates the
impact that earnings inflation in a company’s financial accounts has on its tax accounting. A company that inflates earnings must either falsify its federal income tax return and pay
tax on phantom income or face a significant risk that its earnings fraud will be detected. Thus, for many companies that inflate book income, tax fraud becomes a necessary component of
the accounting fraud.
C. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Unfortunately, WorldCom is not alone in engaging in
fraudulent earnings inflation.62 The problem is significant and
has grown in recent years, creating a corresponding threat to
the integrity of corporate income tax reporting in the eyes of
the public and other corporations alike. A 1999 study released
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway

but might seek to reinstate the NOLs. Any attempt to reinstate NOLs should,
like refund claims, be subject to the equitable defenses discussed in this Article.
61. According to a recent study of firms that overstated accounting income
and paid additional taxes as a result, the median firm was willing to pay an
additional eight cents in income tax for each dollar of inflated pre-tax earnings. See Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings That
Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79
ACCT. REV. 387, 387 (2004).
62. Other companies that have restated previously inflated earnings include: Bristol-Myers Squibb ($2.5 billion from 1999 to 2002), Computer Associates ($1 billion), Enron ($1.2 billion in 2000), HealthSouth ($2.5 billion since
1986), Qwest Communications International ($144 million in 2000 and 2001),
Rite Aid Corporation ($1.6 billion), and Xerox ($6.4 billion from 1997 to 2001).
See Toedtman, supra note 10. AOL Time Warner also overstated its earnings
by $500 million from 2000 through 2002. See Julia Angwin, SEC Fines Time
Warner $300 Million, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2005, at A3. Earnings manipulation has not been limited to U.S. corporations. Dutch food retailer, Ahold NV,
has acknowledged that it exaggerated earnings by $1.08 billion from 2000 to
2002 (although Ahold’s U.S. subsidiary, U.S. Foodservice, accounted for $856
million of the overstatement). Ahold’s Estimate of Restatement Is Raised
Again, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2003, at B7; Deborah Ball, Ahold Chairman Plans
to Resign Amid Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at B4. Likewise, in Italy, international dairy giant Parmalat SpA, reportedly inflated its earnings
by more than $1 billion and attempted to hide more than $8 billion in debt.
Alessandra Galloni et al., Scope of Scandal at Parmalat Widens to More Than
$8 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at A1.
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Commission (COSO)63 assessed the extent of corporate financial statement fraud for the eleven-year period from 1987
through 1997.64 The commissioned study examined hundreds of
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in order to identify specific instances of financial statement fraud.65
Only those AAERs that reflected a violation of the SEC rules
most directly related to financial fraud were included in the
study’s sample.66 The study found that from 1987 through
1997, nearly 300 companies were involved in financial statement fraud.67 Of the 200 companies randomly selected from
this group for closer examination, all were publicly traded, but
they tended to be relatively small (less than $100 million in total assets).68 Only 22 percent of the companies were listed on
the New York or American Stock Exchanges.69
The number of companies inflating earnings rose dramatically after 1997, according to a 2002 General Accounting Office
(GAO) study.70 To identify earnings inflation, the GAO Study
examined financial statement restatements announced by publicly traded companies during the period from 1997 through
June, 2002. The study was limited to restatements arising from
“accounting irregularities,” or situations in which a company
initially had not fairly presented its financial statements in ac-

63. COSO is a private sector initiative, jointly sponsored and funded by
the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Management Accountants, and the Institute of Internal Auditors. COSO Home Page,
http://www.coso.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
64. MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE
TREADWAY COMM’N, FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 1987–1997: AN
ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 (1999), available at http://www.coso
.org/publications/FFR_1987_1997.pdf.
65. BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 4. An AAER contains a summary of
enforcement action taken against a public company by the SEC. Id.
66. Specifically, the study focused on violations of Rule 10(b)-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2005) (promulgated by the SEC under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000)), and section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000). BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 64, at
4.
67. BEASLEY ET AL., supra note 64, at 4.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id.
70. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL
STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS 4 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d03138.pdf.
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cordance with GAAP.71 The growth in the number of earnings
restatements during the period studied was remarkable.
Whereas the COSO Study found 300 incidents of financial
statement fraud in the eleven-year period it covered, the GAO
Study found that 225 companies restated earnings because of
accounting irregularities in 2001 alone, with 250 more company
restatements projected for 2002.72 Between 1997 and June,
2002, the number of companies restating earnings grew by 145
percent, with that growth expected to increase to 170 percent
by the end of 2002.73 In other words, during the five-year period
studied, roughly 10 percent of all listed companies announced a
restatement of earnings arising from accounting irregularities,
most of which involved the sort of fraud committed by WorldCom.74
As the incidence of earnings restatements increased, the
profile of companies restating earnings also shifted. According
to the GAO Study, large company restatements rose significantly after 1997.75 The median market capitalization of a restating company rose from $500 million in 1997 to over $2 billion in 2002. Moreover, of the 125 public companies that
restated earnings because of accounting irregularities in 2002,
107 (over 85 percent) were listed on either the New York Stock
Exchange or NASDAQ—markets that are home to the largest
corporations.76
71. Id. at 2. Over half of the accounting irregularities resulted from improper “revenue recognition” or “cost or expense related issues.” Id. at 20–21.
Creating fictitious income would fall within the former category, while WorldCom’s improper capitalization of line costs would fall within the latter category. Id. at 19–20.
72. As of this writing, the GAO has not updated its study for periods after
June, 2002. A more recent study by the Huron Consulting Group indicates
that between the years 2000 and 2004 overall financial statement restatements nearly doubled, increasing from 233 to 414. HURON CONSULTING
GROUP, 2004 ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL REPORTING MATTERS 4 (2005),
available
at
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/Huron_
2004_Review%20of%20Financial%20Reporting%20Matters.pdf.
73. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 4.
74. Id.
75. For purposes of the study, a “large” company was one with a market
capitalization of over $10 billion. Id. at 4 n.6. The study obtained similar results where a large company was defined as one having over $1 billion in assets. Id.
76. See National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ), NASDAQ National Market Securities, http://www.nasdaq.com/
asp/symbols.asp?exchange=NNM (last visited Sept. 12, 2005); New York Stock
Exchange, Listed Company Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/
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In short, the COSO study and the GAO Study compellingly
suggest that for at least the last eighteen years we have been in
a period of significant corporate earnings restatements that
have accelerated dramatically since 1997. In a large number of
cases, those restatements correct for earnings inflated through
fraudulent accounting activity by a group of companies that includes a rapidly growing percentage of large, publicly traded
corporations. Although it is possible that corrective steps taken
by the SEC and Congress to reduce fraudulent financial reporting77 may begin to reduce the incidence of earnings inflation,
none of the available data suggest that this has occurred, and
anecdotal evidence indicates that earnings inflation remains a
problem.78 Moreover, the COSO study makes it clear that although the number of cases has ballooned in the last few years,
earnings inflation has been a persistent part of the corporate

listed.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
77. See supra note 12.
78. Corporate earnings restatements reached a record high in 2004. See
Diya Gullapalli, To Err Is Human, To Restate Financials, Divine, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 20, 2005, at C3 (noting the Huron Study reported a 28 percent increase in
error-driven restatements to set the record in 2004). Unlike the COSO and
GAO Studies, the Huron Study did not differentiate between restatements
that were attributable to fraud and those that were not. See HURON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 72, at 3. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that,
at the very least, a relatively constant percentage of all restatements will involve the type of illegal activity identified in the COSO and GAO Studies.
Thus, one could reasonably conclude that, given the large number of overall
restatements, those involving irregularities of the sort identified in the COSO
Study and the GAO Study also increased. Companies that recently admitted
inflating their earnings under circumstances that indicate fraudulent activity
include Fannie Mae, the giant mortgage-finance company, which was found to
have overstated its earnings by some $9 billion during a period beginning in
2001 and continuing through mid-2004, see James R. Hagerty et al., Fannie Is
Directed to Restate Results After SEC Review, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2004, at
A1; Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., which overstated its net income by as
much as 8 percent for fiscal year 2004, see Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks,
Fresh Woes Batter Krispy Kreme, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2005, at A3; and Nortel
Networks Corporation, which overstated its 2003 net income by almost $300
million, see Mark Heinzl & Ken Brown, Nortel Unveils New Accounting Flubs,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at A3. Additionally, several restaurant operators,
including Applebee’s International Inc., CKE Restaurants, Inc. (owner of the
Hardee’s and Carl’s Jr. chains), Brinker International (operator of Chili’s), and
Darden Restaurants (operator of Red Lobster, Olive Garden and other chains),
improperly understated lease expenses and thus inflated reported earnings.
See Steven D. Jones & Richard Gibson, Restaurants Serve Up Restatements:
More Scrutiny of Leases Is Leading Some Chains to Trim Their Past Profits,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2005, at C3.
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financial reporting picture for over a decade and a half. Thus, it
is likely that the concomitant tax fraud will persist for some
time as well.
II. TAX FRAUD: PENALTIES AND REFUNDS
For companies that engage in earnings inflation, falsify
their tax returns to conceal the earnings inflation, and then get
caught, there are consequences. The SEC imposes some measure of punishment for companies’ violation of securities law.79
The IRS may also impose penalties for a company’s violation of
the tax law. This part of the Article discusses the severity of
the penalties attached to tax fraud and then describes how
readily a corporation may retrieve the taxes it paid based on a
fraudulent tax return, receiving interest on the refund to boot.
A. TAX FRAUD DEFINED
The Internal Revenue Code contains a host of penalty provisions designed to reinforce government claims to revenues
owed by U.S. taxpayers. These provisions fall into two general
categories: civil penalties and criminal penalties.80 Both a civil
penalty and a criminal penalty potentially are applicable to the
filing of a fraudulent tax return by a taxpayer in a situation
like WorldCom’s. However, as discussed below, in the circumstance of an overpayment of tax, the civil tax fraud offense carries no penalty.81 The criminal offense of signing a fraudulent
or false income tax return, on the other hand, is subject to a
positive penalty where a tax overpayment is involved.82 Unfortunately, that penalty is extremely small in both real and relative terms and thus will not likely deter nor adequately punish
the corporate malfeasance involved.83 Moreover, congressional
attention to tax penalties, in general, has inexplicably failed to

79. See supra note 12.
80. A critical difference between civil and criminal penalties in this context is that civil penalties may be collected through assessment procedures,
whereas criminal penalties are imposed only after a criminal conviction. See
Jasper v. Hellmich, 4 F.2d 852, 855–56 (E.D. Mo. 1925) (holding that where
“penalties” as opposed to “taxes” are involved, the Constitution’s due process
guarantees may not be disregarded by permitting assessment without a jury
trial). Tax assessment procedures are described generally in §§ 6203, 6204.
I.R.C. §§ 6203–6204 (2000).
81. I.R.C. § 6663 (2000).
82. Id. § 7206(1).
83. See infra Part III.D.3 (discussing penalty optimality).
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focus on the criminal sanction.84 This section discusses the civil
and criminal fraud penalty provisions, as well as the intereston-overpayment provision.
1. Civil Tax Fraud
The civil tax fraud statue imposes a substantial penalty
that is added to the tax owed by the taxpayer where fraud is
involved.85 However, the penalty is calculated under the statute
as 75 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer fraudulently
underpaid its tax.86 Thus, in a case like WorldCom’s, where an
overpayment rather than an underpayment of tax is involved,
application of the civil fraud penalty produces no fine. Accordingly, although the Code purports to impose a civil penalty for
fraud, that penalty, in effect, merely serves as a reinforcement
of the statutory prohibition on tax evasion.87 Thus, only the

84. In 1998, Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury and the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation to review the administration and implementation by the IRS of the penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code and make recommendations to simplify penalty administration. Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3801, 112 Stat. 685, 782. In sweeping studies released in July 1999 (the
Joint Committee study ran to more than 600 pages in two volumes; the Treasury study was a terse 188 pages), neither the Treasury nor the Joint Committee made reference to either of I.R.C. §§ 7206 or 7207. See STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) (Comm. Print 1999), available
at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/joint/hjoint01cp106.html (follow hyperlinks corresponding to JCS-3-99); TREASURY DEP’T, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS (1999), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ctswhite.pdf. Although the
Joint Committee noted that its study was confined to “civil penalties,” it is not
clear why, since the congressional mandate was not limited to civil penalties.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3801; STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 13. Moreover, the Joint Committee
did discuss the I.R.C. § 7203 criminal penalty for willful failure to pay estimated tax and otherwise took a broad approach to its task. I.R.C. § 7203;
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 13–14, 112. For example, the
Committee discussed whether or not to include the “marriage penalty” and
provisions that deny deductions for failure to properly substantiate expenses.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra, at 13–14, 112.
85. I.R.C. § 6663.
86. Id. (“If any part of any underpayment of tax required to be shown on a
return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 75
percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.”).
87. Id. § 7201.
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criminal fraud penalty discussed in the following section applies to a corporation that inflates its taxable income in order to
disguise the inflation of its accounting income.
2. Criminal Tax Fraud
When a corporation like WorldCom files a federal income
tax return reflecting fraudulently inflated income, the corporation becomes subject to the felony “fraud and false statement”
provisions of § 7206(1).88 That section applies to any person
who “[w]illfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or
other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and
which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter.”89 Thus, for a corporation to be convicted under
the “fraud and false statement” provision there must be (1) an
officer who willfully signs the corporation’s tax return; (2) the
execution of that signature under penalty of perjury; and (3)
the officer’s knowledge that the return is false and inaccurate.90
88. Id. § 7206(1). Technically, two additional criminal provisions might
apply. First, the general federal fraud statute, which is similar to § 7206(1),
would apply to a taxpayer that knowingly and willfully “(1) falsifies, conceals,
or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3)
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.” 18 U.S.C.A. §
1001 (West 2005). The IRS Criminal Investigation Division has jurisdiction to
investigate violations of the fraud statue. 26 C.F.R. § 601.107(a) (2005); Internal Revenue Service, United States Code Statutes for Which Criminal Investigation Has Jurisdiction, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,
id=108861,00.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005) (listing sections of the United
States Code over which the Criminal Investigation Division has jurisdiction).
Because 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 generally is co-extensive with I.R.C. § 7206(1), it is
not discussed separately here.
Second, a corporation might also be subject to the misdemeanor “willful
delivery or disclosure of false documents” provisions of § 7207. I.R.C. § 7207
(Supp. 2002). That section applies to “[a]ny person who willfully delivers or
discloses to the Secretary any list, return, account, statement, or other document, known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any material matter.”
Id. To be convicted under this provision there must be, with respect to the corporation, (1) a willful act of delivery or disclosure; and (2) knowledge that the
document delivered is false and inaccurate. For purposes of § 7207, “willfulness” and “knowledge” are defined in the same manner, described below, as
they are for purposes of § 7206(1). See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying
text.
89. I.R.C. § 7206(1).
90. Each of these acts, if committed by agents or employees of a corporation acting within the scope of their employment, is considered to have been
committed by the corporation under general agency principles. See N.Y. Cent.
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The “willfulness” required in the first element refers to a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.91 As to the
execution of the signature under perjury, a corporate officer always signs the corporation’s tax return under penalty of perjury.92 Finally, a corporate defendant satisfies the “knowledge”

& Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (“We see no
valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation
which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of
its agents to whom it has intrusted authority to act . . . .”). This includes acts
related to the filing of corporate tax returns. United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A corporation will be held
liable under 26 U.S.C.S. § 7206(1) when its agent deliberately causes it to
make and subscribe to a false income tax return.”); Inner-City Temps., Inc. v.
Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 726, 733 (1990) (noting that for a corporation, requisite fraudulent intent must be found in the acts of its officers and shareholders). For the corporation to be liable, the employee first must have intended
that his act would have produced some benefit to the corporation, or some
benefit both to himself and the corporation. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d
800, 823 (11th Cir. 1984). The reason for requiring that an agent acted with
intent to benefit the corporation is to prevent the corporation from being
criminally liable for actions of its agents that are contrary to the company’s
interests or solely for the agent’s benefit. United States v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). A corporation is not relieved of
criminal liability, however, merely because the employee may have derived
some personal benefit from his actions. United States v. Ruidoso Racing Ass’n,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 476 F.2d 502, 505–06 (10th Cir. 1973); Crescent Mfg. Co. v.
Comm’r, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 630, 631–32 (1948). Moreover, a corporation generally may not avoid criminal liability by simply asserting that an agent violated
a corporate policy of adhering to the law. United States v. Hilton Hotel Corp.,
467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[Corporate] liability may attach without
proof that the conduct was within the agent’s actual authority, and even
though it may have been contrary to express instructions.”); Cont’l Baking Co.
v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 150 (6th Cir. 1960) (“A corporation which employs an agent in a responsible position cannot say that the man was only ‘authorized’ to act legally and the corporation will not answer for his violations of
law which inure to the corporation’s benefit.”).
91. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973).
92. I.R.C. § 6065 (2000). A corporation’s tax return must be signed by its
president, vice president, treasurer, assistant treasurer, chief accounting officer, or any other corporate officer authorized to sign. Id. § 6062; INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEP’T, CAT. NO. 1145ST, INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FORMS 1120 AND 1120-A 3 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i1120_a.pdf. The corporate tax return includes the following statement
immediately above the officer’s signature line: “Under penalties of perjury, I
declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules
and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct,
and complete.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TREASURY DEP’T, FORM 1120, U.S.
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURN (OMB NO. 1545-0123) 1 (2004), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf.
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element of the offense if corporation’s employees collectively
possess the requisite knowledge.93
B. MATERIALITY AND HARM
It is important to note that a tax deficiency is not a requisite element of § 7206(1).94 That is, the filing of a fraudulent return subjects the taxpayer to the tax fraud penalty regardless
of whether the fraud results in an underpayment of tax. Taxpayers have attempted to read a tax deficiency element into the
statute by focusing on the requirement that a return be true
and correct “as to every material matter.”95 A false statement
on a return cannot be “material,” so the argument goes, if it
does not result in a loss of tax revenue to the government. The
courts’ responses to this issue inform one normative question
raised by this Article’s proposal to use equity to significantly
increase the penalty for tax fraud—namely, whether a substantial penalty, or any penalty at all, should be attached to an offense that results in an overpayment of tax.
Courts have long held that, for purposes of § 7206(1), a
false statement is material if it is necessary to compute the tax
involved,96 or “has ‘the potential for hindering the IRS’s efforts
to monitor and verify the tax liability’ of the corporation and

93. The First Circuit has described it this way: “Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes
the corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation.” United States v. Bank
of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d at 1454. Were it otherwise, a corporation could
avoid liability by simply asserting that no single employee comprehended the
full import of information that was obtained by several employees. Bank of
New England, 821 F.2d at 856.
94. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000); e.g., United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724,
736 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. Brooksby, 668 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Jacobson, 547 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Miller, 491
F.2d 638, 646 (5th Cir. 1974). A tax deficiency is also not an element of the
misdemeanor “willful delivery or disclosure of false documents” provisions of
I.R.C. § 7207. I.R.C. § 7207 (Supp. 2002); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S.
343, 352 (1965).
95. § 7206(1); see also Sansone, 380 U.S. at 352 (construing § 7207); Marabelles, 724 F.2d at 1380 (construing § 7206(1)); United States v. Coppola, 425
F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1969) (construing § 7207).
96. United States v. Warden, 545 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that
omitted items may be material where reporting is necessary “for the taxpayer
to estimate and compute his tax correctly”); United States v. Rayor, 204 F.
Supp. 486, 490 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (to same effect).
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the taxpayer.”97 The cases establishing this materiality standard present three distinct factual situations: those in which
the taxpayer’s fraudulent return results in an underpayment of
taxes, those in which the return results in no change in the
taxes paid, and those resulting in an overpayment of taxes. As
one intuitively would expect, courts uniformly have found materiality in the first situation. That is, if a taxpayer has underreported taxable income and, as a result, underpaid her income
tax, courts virtually always find the tax return to be false with
respect to a “material” matter.98 However, the courts have
reached exactly the same conclusion in the second situation, as
well. For example, in United States v. Marashi, the Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer’s claim that his return was not
fraudulent because available deductions would have left him
with no tax deficiency.99 The court held that falsifying gross re-

97. United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 461 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Greenberg, 735 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1984)); accord Greenberg,
735 F.2d at 31 (“The purpose of § 7206(1) is not simply to ensure that the taxpayer pay the proper amount of taxes—though that is surely one of its goals.
Rather, that section is intended to ensure also that the taxpayer not make
misstatements that could hinder the Internal Revenue Service . . . in carrying
out such functions as the verification of the accuracy of that return or a related tax return.”); United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[A] statement is material if it is capable of influencing actions of the IRS in any matter
within its jurisdiction.”); United States v. DiVarco, 343 F. Supp. 101, 103 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (“[W]ithout truthful representation as to all matters it becomes administratively more difficult, if not impossible, for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to compute the amount of tax due or to check on the accuracy of returns.”), aff ’d, 484 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1973). Under this standard, even a
failure to properly characterize the source of income may be material for these
purposes. DiVarco, 484 F.2d at 673 (“The plain language of the statute does
not exclude the matter of the source of income from the definition of ‘material
matter.’ In light of the need for accurate information concerning the source of
income so that the Internal Revenue Service can police and verify the reporting of individuals and corporations, a misstatement as to the source of income
is a material matter.”); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 532 F. Supp. 1360,
1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (to same effect).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 350 (1973); Sansone,
380 U.S. at 352; United States v. Bove, 155 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Holland, 880 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1989); Marabelles, 724 F.2d at
1380; United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1983);
Brooksby, 668 F.2d at 1103; United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 391–92
(7th Cir. 1977); Warden, 545 F.2d at 37; Coppola, 425 F.2d at 662 (construing
§ 7207).
99. 913 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1990).
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ceipts was a material violation of the statute irrespective of the
fact that the deception did not increase the taxpayer’s tax liability.100
The most compelling case for finding a lack of materiality
is in the third situation, where the taxpayer’s false return results in too much tax being paid. As government tax revenues
actually are augmented (at least temporarily), one might expect
courts to find that any false statement on the return would be
immaterial. Nonetheless, even in this circumstance, the imposition of tax fraud liability has been sustained. In United States
v. Goldman, for example, the taxpayer sought to dismiss a
charge of fraud under § 7206(1) on the ground that any misstatements contained in his tax returns were immaterial because they resulted in an overpayment of taxes.101 The court
declined to dismiss the charge and held that a false statement
could be material even if the result was that the taxpayer paid
too much tax.102 In short, a false statement regarding a matter
necessary to correctly compute one’s tax liability or that hinders the IRS’s determination of tax liability is material, regardless of its ultimate effect on tax liability.103

100. Id.; see also United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir.
1998); Greenberg, 735 F.2d at 31–32; Taylor, 574 F.2d at 235; United States v.
Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1978); Rayor, 204 F. Supp. at 490.
101. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000); 439 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
102. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. at 344; accord United States v. Fawaz, 881
F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that an understatement of expenses on
income tax return was a material matter); United States v. Lamberti, 847 F.2d
1531, 1536 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding taxpayer’s conviction under § 7206(1)
for filing returns that overstated income); United States v. Bouzanis, No. 00
CR 1065, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3289, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2003) (rejecting
argument that taxpayer’s overstatement of income, although false, was not
fraudulent because it was not material); United States v. Lee, 667 F. Supp.
1404, 1419 (D. Colo. 1987) (noting that overstatement of income to conceal
payments made to others is a violation of § 7206(1)), rev’d sub nom. United
States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Potstada,
206 F. Supp. 792, 793–94 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (rejecting taxpayer’s motion to dismiss tax fraud charge on the ground that false statement in gift tax return
procured for the government a tax that was not owing, and was thus not material).
103. The holdings in these cases are reinforced by the fact that Congress
made tax fraud under § 7206(1) a crime separate and apart from tax evasion
under § 7201. I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206(1) (2000); see also Goldman, 439 F. Supp. at
344 (“The conclusion that an overstatement of income may result in a [fraud]
prosecution is buttressed by the congressional determination to make
§ 7206(1) a crime separate and apart from income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201.”); supra note 23 (discussing the relationship between §§ 7201 and
7206(1)).
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This construction of materiality follows from the fact that
§ 7206(1) is, in essence, a perjury statute—it punishes the act
of executing and submitting a false return.104 Thus, when the
false return is filed, the offense is complete, regardless of the
tax consequences that may flow from that return.105 Filing a
false tax return is punishable because it causes harm to the
government. As suggested by the standard for materiality, filing a false return makes it more difficult for the IRS to monitor
and verify the taxpayer’s income.106 A number of cases have
addressed this harm in more specific terms.
For example, in Badaracco v. Commissioner, two business
partners filed fraudulent tax returns and then voluntarily disclosed the fraud in amended returns and paid the tax owed.107
When they were assessed a penalty for filing the original
fraudulent returns, the taxpayers asserted that as a matter of
equity and public policy the standard statute of limitations
should apply (as opposed to the unlimited time available to the
government to make assessments on fraudulent returns),
thereby barring imposition of the fraud penalty.108 They argued
that the amended return provided the government all of the information necessary to make a knowledgeable assessment of
the tax owed, and, thus, the statutory provision eliminating the
limitations period in cases of fraud was not justified.109 The Su104. See United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 980 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Whether there was an actual tax deficiency is irrelevant because the statute
is a perjury statute.”); United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir.
1990) (“Section 7206(1) is a perjury statute; it is irrelevant whether there was
an actual tax deficiency.”); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 392 (7th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975) (stating
that the primary purpose of § 7206(1) is to impose penalties of perjury on
those who willfully falsify their returns); United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d
670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that willful and knowing false statements
about a source of income are material under § 7206(1), regardless of the effect
of the statements). One scholar has characterized certain “false statement”
crimes as hybrids that reflect attributes of both “lying crimes” (such as perjury) and “misleading crimes” (such as fraud). See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury,
Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 173–74, 191–98 (2001).
105. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 736 (quoting United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d
1204, 1212 n.10 (9th Cir. 1976)).
106. See supra notes 96–97. Indeed, this is typical of virtually all perjury
statutes, which one scholar has characterized as involving “deception intended
to obstruct the administration of justice or government investigation or operations.” Green, supra note 104, at 173–74.
107. 464 U.S. 386, 389 (1984).
108. Id. at 389.
109. Id. at 397–98.
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preme Court rejected this argument, noting that the provision
eliminating the limitations period for fraudulent returns was
justified by the government’s need for additional time to overcome specific detriments resulting from the original fraudulent
return.110 First, the Court found that where a fraudulent return
is filed, the government’s ability to ascertain the taxpayer’s
true tax liability may be compromised; during the period of
time that the government relies on the false return, the taxpayer’s underlying records may be falsified or even destroyed.111 Second, the Court found that the fraudulent return
means the government must be particularly diligent and thorough in its determination of the taxpayer’s correct tax liability
because filing the original fraudulent return makes the taxpayer inherently less trustworthy.112 Third, “the difficulties
that attend a civil fraud investigation are compounded” because
of the potential need to refer the case for criminal prosecution.113
In United States v. Goldman,114 the court discussed two
additional burdens related to those identified by the Supreme
Court in Badaracco. First, the court noted that “[t]he accuracy
of items of taxable income reported on the return of one individual or entity may affect the ability of the IRS to assess the
tax liability of another taxpayer.”115 That is, the tax returns of
different taxpayers may contain information about the same
transactions. If that information is falsified in one return, the
IRS must devote additional resources to the determination of
which return is correct. The court also observed that “overstated income may shield from scrutiny falsely inflated deduc-

110. Id. at 398.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 399 (noting that this difficulty is not mitigated by the filing of
an amended return as the amended return “comes carrying no special or significant imprimatur; instead, it comes from a taxpayer who already has made
false statements under penalty of perjury”).
113. Id.
114. 439 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
115. Id. at 344; see also United States v. Fawaz, 881 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir.
1989) (“A false statement is material when it hampers the IRS in verifying . . . related returns submitted by the defendant taxpayer or by a business
entity in which he or she has a direct interest.”); United States v. Greenberg,
735 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the prohibition on false statements
is designed in part to ensure that the IRS is able to verify the accuracy of related tax returns).
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tions,” thus making it more difficult for the IRS to check the accuracy of a return.116
Finally, a more broadly applicable harm associated with
the filing of a fraudulent return is the significant potential for
undermining voluntary compliance with the tax rules. The U.S.
tax system relies heavily on truthful self-reporting by taxpayers.117 As the Ninth Circuit observed in affirming a conviction
under I.R.C. § 7206, “[B]ecause the tax system is based on selfreporting, the government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability.”118 If each potential taxpayer
does not disclose honestly all information relevant to his or her
tax liability, the integrity of the nation’s tax system is damaged.119 If the number of false tax returns grows, so, too, will
public doubt about the accuracy and truthfulness of all tax returns within the system. If the public perceives that there is
116. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. at 344; see also Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492, 495 (1943) (“[T]axpayers’ neglect or deceit may prejudice the orderly
and punctual administration of the system as well as the revenues themselves.”). As discussed in supra text accompanying notes 95–96, an element of
the offense of filing a false tax return under I.R.C. § 7206(1) is that the false
statement on the return be “material,” a term that in this context the courts
have interpreted to mean a false statement that “could have influenced or affected the IRS in carrying out the functions committed to it by law.” United
States v. DiRico, 78 F.3d 732, 736 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing to United States v.
Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975)); see also I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000);
Fawaz, 881 F.2d at 263–64; United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 235 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973). Thus,
the language of the tax fraud statute itself, as interpreted by the courts, suggests that false statements risk impeding IRS attempts to determine a particular individual’s tax liability.
117. See Spies, 317 U.S. at 495 (“The United States has relied for the collection of its income tax largely upon the taxpayer’s own disclosures rather
than upon a system of withholding the tax from him by those from whom income may be received. This system can function successfully only if those
within and near taxable income keep and render true accounts.”); United
States v. Lowe, No. 95-10111, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1628, at *9 (9th Cir. Jan.
18, 1996). Although the U.S. tax system today relies much more heavily on
withholding than it did in 1943, when Spies was decided, there remain enough
exceptions to withholding to warrant concern about any trends in taxpayer
behavior that would tend to undermine voluntary compliance.
118. Lowe, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1628, at *9–10 (quoting United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) (internal quotations omitted).
119. See United States v. Bove, 155 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing
that filing a false tax return in violation of § 7206 is an offense that undermines “the integrity of the nation’s tax system”); see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 introductory cmt. (2004) (“The criminal tax laws
are designed to protect the public interest in preserving the integrity of the
nation’s tax system.”).
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widespread gaming of the system for personal advantage
(whether by understatement or overstatement of income), voluntary compliance is likely to be sharply reduced.120 Thus, as
the Seventh Circuit has observed, “For the . . . system to function properly, there must be not just truthful reporting, but
also the ability to assure truthful reporting.”121
In summary, a tax return may be fraudulent with respect
to a material matter regardless of whether there is a corresponding loss of tax revenue to the government. This conclusion
is derived from the fact that the act of filing a false return
harms the government. The extent to which the harm caused
by the filing of a fraudulent return should influence the amount
of the fraud penalty is part of the discussion of public policy in
Part III.D.3. The following section begins to frame that issue by
examining the magnitude of the current penalty.
C. MAGNITUDE OF CURRENT PENALTY
Vigorous IRS prosecution of corporations filing income tax
returns in violation of the criminal tax fraud provisions likely
would have no discernible deterrent effect because only nominal penalties are available. For example, the maximum fine
imposed on a corporation that violates § 7206(1) is $500,000.122
120. Although now a number of years out of date, the IRS commissioned a
study in 1984 to better understand what factors encouraged noncompliance
with the tax system. YANKELOVITCH, SKELLY, & WHITE, INC., TAXPAYER ATTITUDES STUDY: FINAL REPORT 2 (1984). As one measure of compliance, the
study evaluated attitudes condoning tax cheating. Id. at 56. A key variable
that was closely linked to attitudes condoning tax noncompliance was “skepticism about human integrity.” Id. As defined by the study, this variable reflects
the belief that most people cheat; indeed, that the only people who do not
cheat are those who cannot find opportunity to do so. Id. When taxpayers were
asked to assign weights to several reasons why “other people” cheat on taxes,
one of the factors most responsible for cheating was the perception that the
tax system is unfair. Id. at 62. There is substantial economic literature on the
effect of taxpayer attitudes on tax compliance, with most researchers concluding that taxpayer perceptions of fairness in the tax system and perceptions of
compliance by other taxpayers significantly affect the overall rate of tax compliance. See, e.g., Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence
Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE
PAY TAXES 193, 214 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
121. United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 391 (7th Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added).
122. Although I.R.C. § 7206(5)(B) provides a penalty of $500,000, the
Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 imposed alternative maximum fines
for federal crimes occurring after December 31, 1984. I.R.C. § 7206(5)(B)
(2000); Pub. L. No. 98-596, § 6, 98 Stat. 3134, 3136–38. The maximum fine applicable to an organization convicted of a felony is equal to the greater of (1)
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However, the actual fine imposed would be considerably less
because of the overlay of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.123 According
to the Guidelines, sentencing for the filing of fraudulent or false
returns under § 7206 begins with a base offense level that is
determined by the amount of the tax loss.124 Because overstatements of income do not produce a tax loss, the default base
offense level results in a fine of a mere $5,000,125 which may be
increased to $40,000 if the crime involves “sophisticated
means.”126 Assuming that sophisticated means are used, and
that the corporation is subject to the maximum culpability factor enhancement provided by the Guidelines, the fine would
still not exceed $160,000.127 Whether or not the lower fine de$500,000 and (2) an alternative fine equal to twice the amount of any pecuniary gain derived from the offense. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 § 6.
A corporation violating the misdemeanor “willful delivery or disclosure of false
documents” provisions of I.R.C. § 7207 would be subject to a maximum fine of
$200,000. I.R.C. § 7207 (Supp. 2002). Although § 7207 provides a maximum
fine of $50,000, under the Criminal Fine Improvement Act of 1987, the maximum fine for an organization convicted of a misdemeanor not resulting in
death is equal to the greater of (1) $200,000 and (2) an alternative fine equal
to twice the amount of any pecuniary gain derived from the offense. Pub. L.
No. 100-185, § 6, 101 Stat. 1279, 1280 (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 3571
(2000)). The alternative fines do not apply, however, if their application would
“unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(c)–
(d). It is likely that the alternative fines would not apply in a case like WorldCom’s; although the company clearly benefited from exaggerating its taxable
income to disguise inflation of its book income, quantifying that benefit would
be extremely difficult.
123. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2004). In the
recent case of United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines that made them
mandatory. 125 S. Ct. 738, 764 (2005) (Breyer, J., majority opinion in part).
Thus, after Booker, district courts “are not bound to apply the Guidelines,
[but] must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Id. at 767; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000). Therefore, although courts
will not be required to impose the lower sentence provided in the Guidelines
for filing fraudulent and false returns, they nevertheless may do so absent
other compelling considerations. As a result, the penalty under § 7206 likely
will remain inconsequential.
124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 119, § 2T1.1(a).
125. Id. §§ 2T1.1(a)(2), 2T1.1(b)(2), 8C2.4(d).
126. Id. §§ 2T1.1(b)(2), 8C2.4(d).
127. This figure is based on a maximum culpability multiplier of four,
which is arrived at by assuming that the corporate taxpayer (1) tolerated
criminal activity, (2) had a prior history of criminal activity, and (3) obstructed
the investigation of the offense. Id. §§ 8C2.5(a)–(c), (e), 8C2.6. This penalty
would be imposed in lieu of the $500,000 maximum provided by the statute.
See id. § 8C3.1(a).
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termined under the Guidelines actually would be imposed, it is
a pittance compared, for example, to the nearly $300 million
that WorldCom is reported to have collected in tax refunds.128
One might suspect that Congress intended to impose only
nominal punishment on those who file false tax returns. While
this is possible, the fine imposed for criminal tax evasion under
§ 7201 is equally small,129 despite the fact that the government
clearly considers tax evasion a serious offense.130 The better
explanation is that this is simply an example of the tendency
for civil penalties in this area to be significantly greater than
the corresponding criminal sanction.131 Perhaps as a result of
this tendency, criminal prosecution has not played a significant
role in the government’s response to tax fraud and tax evasion.132 The higher burden of proof and the need to establish
128. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15.
129. I.R.C. § 7201 (2000) (“Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in
the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”).
130. See, e.g., Reducing the Tax Gap Can Contribute to Fiscal Sustainability but Will Require a Variety of Strategies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance (GAO-05-527T), 109th Cong. 12 (2005) (statement of David M.
Walker, Comptroller General of the United States) (noting the government’s
longstanding concern about the $312 to $353 billion “tax gap” created by taxpayer noncompliance).
131. This tendency is puzzling because criminal penalties typically are considered to be punitive in nature, while civil penalties are remedial in nature
and designed to compensate the government for its loss from the fraud. See
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398–401 (1938). Given this understanding
of the respective purposes of criminal and civil penalties, one would expect
that the former would be significantly greater than the latter. In fact, the opposite is true, and the courts have reinforced this fact by concluding that penalties of 50 percent of an understatement of income attributable to fraud are
remedial rather than punitive in nature. E.g., id. at 401–03; Barnette v.
Comm’r, 95 T.C. 341, 347–48 (1990).
132. Between 1998 and 2003, the IRS imposed a total of approximately
14,500 civil penalties for tax fraud. This figure includes civil fraud penalties
assessed, after abatements, in five categories: individual income tax, corporate
income tax, employment tax, excise tax, and estate and gift tax. See Internal
Revenue Service, SOI Tax Stats - Enforcing Laws, Civil Penalties Assessed
and Abated, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/compliancestats/article/0,,id=97177,00
.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). During the same six-year period, however, a
total of only approximately 3,600 indictments were brought under the Internal
Revenue Code’s criminal fraud provisions. See Internal Revenue Service, Enforcement Strategy - Criminal Investigation (CI), Criminal Investigation (CI)
Annual Business Reports, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/
0,,id=107522,00.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005). This figure includes indict-
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the requisite intent make it difficult for the government to successfully prosecute taxpayers under criminal provisions such as
§§ 7201 and 7206(1).133 Thus, the civil tax fraud provision has
become the staple of federal tax evasion and tax fraud prosecutions, and the penalty associated with that offense is significant
in the case of underpayments of tax.134 Unfortunately, as noted
above, the civil tax fraud offense is not subject to any penalty
where the fraudulent tax return gives rise to an overpayment
of tax. What is needed is a more robust penalty to deter corporations from making fraudulent statements to the IRS in order
to bolster false earnings reports to shareholders.
D. GETTING A REFUND
Before discussing how refund claims might be denied in
circumstances that involve false tax returns, it may be helpful
to review the refund process itself. As will be seen, the process
is somewhat mechanical, and the IRS’s role in the process, to
date, generally has been ministerial in nature.
1. The Process
A corporate tax-refund claim that does not simply involve
an erroneous payment generally arises from a dispute between
the corporation and the government about the correct tax
treatment of some item of income, credit, or deduction. In such
circumstances, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to
make a refund only if it is determined that there was an “over-

ments brought under §§ 7206(1)–(2), 7207. Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 7206(1)–(2),
7207 (2000 & Supp. 2002, respectively). A direct comparison of civil and criminal fraud penalties leveled against corporate offenders is not possible, as the
IRS has only recently begun to compile separate statistics relating to criminal
penalties for corporate tax fraud. However, in general, the IRS apparently has
heavily favored civil sanctions in tax fraud cases, as evidenced by the fact that
civil penalties outnumbered criminal penalties by more than five to one during
this period.
133. See 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 143 (“It
is a felony to sign a return unless the signer believes it to be ‘true and correct
as to every material matter.’ However, criminal prosecution and conviction is
[sic] rare because the government must prove the offending taxpayer’s guilty
state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. Two of the Code’s civil penalties . . . provide the principal means by which the Federal government assures
accuracy of tax return information.”) (emphasis added).
134. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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payment” of tax.135 Although the term is not explicitly defined
in the Internal Revenue Code, the Supreme Court has held that
an overpayment arises from “the payment of more than is
rightfully due.”136 Thus, a company that has paid federal income tax on earnings that were fraudulently inflated quite
clearly has made an overpayment for these purposes and may
seek a refund of the excess tax paid.
The Treasury Secretary is not merely “authorized” to issue
refunds. The Code provides that where a person makes an
overpayment, the Secretary “shall, subject to [certain exceptions] refund any balance to such person.”137 The refund requirement, as applicable to corporations, is subject to only
three exceptions.138 First, the Secretary may credit the amount
of the overpayment against any outstanding internal revenue
tax liability of the corporation that made the overpayment.139
Next, the amount of any overpayment to be refunded must be
reduced by the amount of any past-due, legally enforceable
debts owed to federal agencies.140 Finally, if the corporation
owes past-due, legally enforceable, state income tax obligations,
the refund is further reduced by those amounts.141 Apart from
these exceptions, nothing in the statute authorizes the Secretary to depart from the command of § 6402 that an overpayment of tax be refunded to the taxpayer.

135. See I.R.C. § 6402(a) (2000).
136. Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 531 (1947). The only statutory content given to the term is found in I.R.C. § 6401(a), which states that an
overpayment includes amounts assessed or collected from the taxpayer after
the expiration of the statute of limitations for such assessment or collection.
I.R.C. § 6401(a) (2000).
137. I.R.C. § 6402(a) (emphasis added); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-1
(1985). In lieu of receiving a refund check, a taxpayer may elect to credit the
amount of any refund against the amount of estimated income tax for any taxable year. See § 6402(b).
138. This statement assumes that the corporation has timely filed a refund
claim in accordance with the provisions of I.R.C. § 6511. I.R.C. § 6511 (Supp.
2002). A number of issues have arisen in the interpretation of these provisions, the treatment of which is beyond the scope of this Article. See MICHAEL
I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 11.05 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
139. See I.R.C. §§ 6402(a), (e)(3).
140. See Id. §§ 6402(d), (e)(3). In the case of individuals, refunds must be
reduced by amounts of past-due child support before being reduced for debts
owed to federal agencies. See Id. §§ 6402(c), (e)(3).
141. Id. § 6402(e)(3).

BOISE_3FMT

2005]

11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM

PLAYING WITH “MONOPOLY MONEY”

177

No refund will be forthcoming, however, unless and until
the taxpayer files a timely claim for refund.142 A refund claim
must be filed within three years from the time the return was
filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of
such periods expires later.143 The amount of the refund to
which the taxpayer is entitled may be limited by the timeliness
of the refund claim. If the refund claim is filed within three
years from the time the return was filed, the refund may not
exceed the portion of the tax paid during the three-year period
immediately preceding the filing of the claim, plus the period of
any extension granted for the filing of the return.144 If the refund claim is not filed within three years from the time the return was filed, the refund is limited to the portion of the tax
paid during the two years immediately preceding the filing of
the claim.145 The three-year statutory refund period may not be
extended except in conjunction with an extension of the limitations period for the assessment of tax.146
A refund claim may be filed in one of two ways. First, if a
corporation files a properly executed original income tax return
reflecting an overpayment of tax for the taxable year (for example because of excess quarterly estimated tax payments), the
tax return itself serves as the claim for credit or refund of such
overpayment.147 Alternatively, where the overpayment is not
discovered until after a tax return has been filed, the corporation must file an amended return on Form 1120X.148 In the

142. Id. § 6511(b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-1 (1985) (noting that the Secretary may not make a refund unless a claim for credit or refund is timely filed
by the taxpayer). The refund claim also is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the
filing of a refund suit. See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2000) (noting that no refund suit
may be filed until a refund claim has been filed with the Secretary).
143. I.R.C. § 6511(a). If no return was filed by the taxpayer, the refund
claim must be filed within two years from the time the tax was paid. Id.
144. See id. § 6511(b). The three-year statutory refund period is relatively
short. If a corporation’s earnings inflation is not discovered within the threeyear period, then no refund will be available unless the limitations period has
been extended in conjunction with an extension of the limitations period for
the assessment of tax. See id. §§ 6511(c), 6501(c)(4) (Supp. 2002 & West 2005,
respectively).
145. See id. § 6511(b)(2)(B).
146. See id. §§ 6501(c)(4), 6511(c).
147. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(5) (as amended in 1997). A corporation
files its income tax return on Form 1120. Id.
148. Id. § 301.6402-3(a)(3) (as amended in 1997).
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situation involving inflated earnings, a corporation like WorldCom knowingly files a false tax return reflecting excessive income and thus an income tax liability that is greater than what
is rightfully due. The overpayment of tax is “discovered” when
the SEC uncovers the fraudulent inflation of earnings. Thus,
claims for refunds of tax paid on inflated earnings are filed by
means of amended returns.
Once the amended return has been duly filed by the corporation, the IRS has six months to review the refund claim and
determine whether to allow it.149 If the IRS disallows the refund claim or fails to respond within six months from the date
the refund claim is filed, the corporation may file a refund
suit.150 The suit may only be brought in an appropriate federal
district court or in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.151
2. The Overpayment Interest Bonus
Not only is a company that has fraudulently overstated its
income entitled to a ready refund of the tax paid, the offending
corporation also is entitled to receive interest from the U.S.
Treasury on the amount of any overpayment of tax. Section
6611152 directs that interest “shall be allowed and paid upon
any overpayment . . . of any internal revenue tax” at a rate that
currently is set at 2.5 percent for refund amounts in excess of
$10,000.153 Generally, the interest is payable from the date of
the overpayment of tax, except that if the IRS refunds an overpayment within forty-five days of the filing of the refund claim,
interest is not payable during that forty-five-day period.154 The

149. I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (2000). As discussed in Part IV.B, infra, a tax refund in excess of $2 million may not be paid out until the Joint Committee has
received a report of the refund and has had thirty days to review it.
150. Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(a) (1967).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2000).
152. I.R.C. § 6611 (2000).
153. See Rev. Rul. 2004-111, 2004-51 I.R.B. 989. A rate of 4 percent applies
to corporate tax refunds of $10,000 or less. Id.
154. I.R.C. §§ 6611(b)(2), (e)(2). See supra Part II.B for a discussion of
“overpayment” in this context. For an argument that interest should be payable on tax overpayments even during this forty-five-day period, see Jeremy R.
Polk, Comment, Compensation for the Fruit of the Fund’s Use: The Takings
Clause and Tax Refunds, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 657, 657–61 (2004).
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effect of this provision is to permit a corporation to use the federal income tax system to disguise its accounting fraud, while
insuring that should the fraud be discovered, the corporation at
least will be compensated in part for the time value of the
money that it deposited with the U.S. Treasury to accomplish
the fraud. The Internal Revenue Code thus unwittingly provides something akin to the “unwind” provisions associated
with abusive corporate tax shelters.155
The federal income tax-refund process as just outlined is
fairly straightforward. Refunds of overpayments of tax are
statutorily required, and once the procedural requisites have
been satisfied and a refund claim filed, the only task for the
IRS is to determine whether the tax paid is more than the
amount rightfully due. If so, the refund must be allowed with
accrued interest on the overpayment. The set of provisions
leading to this result seems impervious to considerations of
fairness or justice. However, it is precisely at the intersection of
strict legal rules and apparent injustice that courts historically
have exercised their equitable powers.156 That is, the role of equity within the legal system is to dispense justice at the interstices of inflexible legal rules.157 The following section addresses the application of equity in the context of tax-refund
suits.158

155. A feature of most abusive corporate tax shelters is a contractual provision entitling the participant in the shelter to effectively “unwind” the transaction if the intended tax consequences are denied by the IRS. This type of provision (also referred to as “contractual protection”) now figures in the
definition of a tax shelter under corporate tax shelter regulations issued in
2003. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2003). To the extent that a
corporation inflating earnings at the cost of an increase in income taxes can
recoup that cost through a tax refund when the earnings inflation is discovered, it has effectively secured “contractual protection” for its fraudulent activity.
156. See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) (“Equity moderates the rigid and uniform application of law by incorporating standards of fairness and morality
into the judicial process.”).
157. See Kennedy, supra note 31, at 609 (“In a broad jurisprudential sense,
equity means the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising discretion to mitigate the rigidity of strict legal rules.”).
158. See Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938)
(“The right and wrong of things and equitable principles have a place in tax
matters.”).
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III. REFUND SUITS AND EQUITY
Equity has been defined as “[j]ustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules
of common law.”159 Because WorldCom falsified its tax returns
to lend credibility to, and avoid detection of, its fraudulent financial activity, denying the company’s claim for a refund of
tax on the falsely reported income arguably would be “equitable” in the sense of responding to normative conceptions of
fairness. But equity involves more than abstract notions of morality and fair play. It also has a well-defined formal dimension, which governs the circumstances under which a court may
dispense an equitable remedy.160 Unless a tax-refund claim is
159. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990); see also Main, supra
note 156, at 430. As a jurisprudential system, equity originated with the
Chancellors of the English High Court of Chancery as an alternative to the
common law dispensed at the same time (and often with contradictory results)
by the judges of the English law courts. See generally KEETON, supra note 32,
at 11–36 (discussing the development of equitable jurisdiction of English
courts); John J. Farley, III, Robin Hood Jurisprudence: The Triumph of Equity
in American Tort Law, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 997, 1001 (1991). Over the centuries, the common law courts became increasingly inflexible as a result of a system of writs that required a plaintiff to fit his claim to a particular form of action or be thrown out of court. See Farley, supra, at 1000–01. By contrast, the
Court of Chancery administered a jurisprudence that grew progressively more
popular because it blunted the harsher effects of the law courts’ system of
writs. Farley, supra, at 1001; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918–19 (1987). Among other reasons, Chancery was
preferred because of the equitable nature of the remedies it dispensed. The
court could make restitutionary awards of money or property, issue declaratory relief, impose so-called “coercive” remedies, and enforce its coercive remedies through the power of contempt, a power not available to a law court. See
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1, at 49 (abr. 2d ed. 1993) (explaining
that a coercive remedy “did not merely declare the defendant’s debt or obligation, but instead commanded the defendant to do or refrain from a specified
act”). A law court, however, could only issue judgments declaring a defendant’s
debt or obligation and order seizure of the defendant’s property to satisfy the
judgment. DOBBS, supra, § 2.1, at 49. The rivalry between Chancery and the
law courts in England was not finally resolved until passage of the Judicature
Acts of 1873, which created a unified court structure charged with applying
both equity and the common law. See Farley, supra, at 1001. However, over a
period of several hundred years, that rivalry helped to shape the significant
evolution of English common law. See Main, supra note 156, at 429 (“Much of
the grand history of Anglo-American law could be characterized as an epic
struggle between the regimes of law and equity.”).
160. Dan Dobbs distinguishes between two meanings of equity and equitable. Thus, “[o]ne group of ideas associated with the term equity suggests fairness and moral quality.” DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.1(3), at 55. A second
meaning “refers simply to the body of precedent or practice or attitude of equity courts.” Id. at 56. The latter governs the circumstances under which a
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“equitable” in this more formal sense, a court would be powerless to uphold the IRS’s denial of a tax refund. This raises the
central question of whether a tax-refund claim is a legal action
or an equitable action.161 In the pivotal case of Stone v. White,
the Supreme Court concluded that it partakes of elements of
both.162
A. STONE V. WHITE
Stone v. White involved a testator, Mr. Stone, who left
property in trust for his wife.163 As was her right, Mrs. Stone
elected to receive the income from the trust instead of any
dower or statutory interest to which she might have been entitled.164 At the time, several circuit courts of appeals had held
that dower rights given up in exchange for trust income were to
be treated as payment for a deemed annuity.165 Thus, like income from an annuity, trust income was not taxable to the
beneficiary of the trust until the aggregate income payments
received exceeded the amount deemed paid for the annuity.166
Adhering to the decisions in the circuit court cases, Mrs.
Stone did not report the income she received from the trust because it did not exceed the amount she was deemed to have

plaintiff may pursue an equitable remedy. See id.
161. The American Colonies adopted the distinction between law and equity along with the English legal system. See John R. Kroger, Supreme Court
Equity, 1789–1835, and the History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
1425, 1438 (1998). The language of the U.S. Constitution is a historical testament to the distinction, which persisted formally until 1938. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] the Laws of the United
States . . . .” (emphasis added)). On Sept. 16, 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective, thus merging law and equity in the federal courts.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law
or in equity . . . .” (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There shall be one
form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
539 (1970) (“Under the Rules there is only one action—a ‘civil action’—in
which all claims may be joined and all remedies are available.”). Today, federal courts exercise both equitable and legal powers in adjudicating claims.
162. 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937).
163. Id. at 533.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Allen v. Brandeis, 29 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1928); United
States v. Bolster, 26 F.2d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1928); Warner v. Walsh, 15 F.2d
367, 367 (2d Cir. 1926).
166. This treatment of annuity income ultimately was replaced in 1954 by
§ 72. I.R.C. § 72 (West 2005).
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paid for the annuity. Instead, the tax on the income was assessed against, and paid by, the trust.167 After the statute of
limitations had run for collecting the tax from Mrs. Stone, the
Supreme Court in Helvering v. Butterworth, overruled the earlier circuit court decisions and held that beneficiaries were indeed taxable on trust income.168 Relying on Butterworth, the
trustees of the Stone trust sued to recover the tax that the trust
had improperly paid.169
The case appeared simple; the trust had paid income tax it
did not owe and was therefore due a refund. Surprisingly, however, the Supreme Court denied the trust’s refund claim.170 The
Court recognized that if it granted the refund to the trust, no
tax would be paid on the trust’s income, since the statute of
limitations barred collection of the tax from Mrs. Stone, the
beneficiary who actually owed the tax under the Butterworth
holding.171 Thus, the Court disregarded the separate entity
status of Mrs. Stone and the trust, and treated Mrs. Stone’s obligation to pay the tax as though it were the obligation of the
trust.172

167. Stone, 301 U.S. at 533.
168. 290 U.S. 365, 370 (1933) (“When she makes her election the widow decides to accept the benefits of the will with the accompanying rights and liabilities. In no proper sense does she purchase an annuity. For reasons satisfactory to herself, she expresses a desire to occupy the position of a beneficiary
and we think she should be so treated.”).
169. Stone, 301 U.S. at 533–34.
170. Id. at 535.
171. Id. at 536.
172. Id. at 537 (“[A] court of equity takes cognizance of the identity in interest of trustee and cestui que trust.”). In this regard, the Court’s decision reflected a judicial trend in the United States, beginning in the mid-1920s and
continuing through the 1930s, of adopting a less formalistic approach to the
interpretation of statutory provisions, particularly tax provisions. The most
notable example of this trend is Judge Learned Hand’s decision in Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), decided just three years before Stone and
subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935). In Gregory, the Court rejected the taxpayer’s attempt to reduce her
tax burden with a tax scheme that was technically permissible but that lacked
a valid business purpose. Id. at 470. Like the decision in Stone, Gregory reflected an assertion of purposive judgment over formalistic interpretation. The
decisions in Stone and Gregory, however, were influenced by political, ideological, and economic factors unique to the United States. A different set of factors
was at work in Britain. In the 1930s, British courts took a path in adjudicating
tax matters that was decidedly more formalistic than the approach adopted by
U.S. courts. See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953,
963 (2004).
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Ignoring legal forms in this manner and collapsing the tax
obligations of Mrs. Stone and the trust in order to reach a just
outcome clearly was an exercise of equitable powers.173 However, the tax-refund suit brought by the trust, like the taxrefund claims asserted by WorldCom and others, historically
was a legal action rather than an equitable action, as the Court
itself acknowledged.174 A principal tenet of equity was that an
equitable remedy was not available to enforce a legal right.175
How could the Court employ equity in what seemed clearly to
be an action at law?
B. EVOLUTION OF THE REFUND SUIT
In answering that question, the Stone Court acknowledged
that by virtue of its historical pedigree the tax-refund suit was
a legal action; it was the lineal successor of the common law
count indebitatus assumpsit.176 However, the Court noted that
173. The Court had no doubt about its authority to exercise equitable powers. See Stone, 301 U.S. at 536–37 (noting that the Court was “free to consider
equitable rights and duties,” and referring to the Court as “a court of equity”
and as having “equity powers”). This Article is concerned with tax-refund
suits, which may be brought only in one of the federal district courts or in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2000). The federal district
courts were established under the powers granted to Congress by Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. Thus, federal district courts may exercise equitable
powers with respect to the resolution of tax-refund suits as a constitutional
matter. Stone would appear to require the Court of Federal Claims, which is
an Article I court, see 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2000), also to exercise equitable powers, at least to the extent of considering equitable defenses to tax refund suits.
See Stone, 301 U.S. at 535; cf. Henry v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 795, 799–800
(1988) (considering and ultimately rejecting a taxpayer’s equitable estoppel
claim on its merits). For an excellent treatment of the extent to which courts
established under Article I (such as the Tax Court) may exercise equitable
powers, see Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax
Court’s Exercise of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 357, 375
(2001).
174. See Stone, 301 U.S. at 536.
175. This is known as the “adequacy of legal remedy” or “irreparable harm”
test, which traditionally permitted equitable relief only in cases where the
available legal remedy was inadequate. There has been substantial debate in
the last two decades about whether the rule actually is observed in practice by
the courts, with many scholars having written its epitaph. See DOBBS, supra
note 159, § 2.5(3), at 97 (“The adequacy rule, as a rule that simply bars the
gate, is virtually dead and probably should be.”); Douglas Laycock, The Death
of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 692 (1990) (“I conclude
that the irreparable injury rule is dead.”).
176. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534 (“The action, brought to recover a tax erroneously paid, although an action at law, is equitable in its function.”) (emphasis
added); cf. Yung F. Chiang, Payment by Mistake in English Law, 11 FLA. J.
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the action had an equitable function.177 Indeed, a brief overview
of the history of the indebitatus assumpsit action supports the
court’s assertion.
First, equity had a significant effect on the origin of the assumpsit action.178 The early English common law system recognized two actions that covered many of the contract-like obligations that arose in the course of business and personal
interactions—namely, covenant and debt.179 Both covenant and
debt actions suffered from infirmities that left them, like much
of the common law system of writs, unavailable for the resolution of many disputes. For example, an action for covenant was
the appropriate remedy for most breaches of promise, but covenant could not be used for promises to pay money or to deliver
goods. It also required a written document under seal, an element that was frequently missing in many routine commercial
transactions.180 An action for debt, on the other hand, which
was available to recover amounts due creditors, did not require
an obligation under seal.181 However, an action for debt applied
only to amounts fixed at the time of the contract, and it could
be defeated by wager of law.182 These considerations made debt
a less than satisfactory remedy for breaches of promises to pay
money.
INT’L L. 91, 97–98 (1996) (“In England, an action to recover payment for
money had and received on the ground of mistake is within the jurisdiction of
the court of law. Chancery, the equity court, never dealt with such action
unless the plaintiff based the action on the fraud on the part of the defendant
or unless the plaintiff, in an insolvency case, requested the court to distribute
assets among claimants.”).
177. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534.
178. Assumpsit means “he undertook” or “he promised.” Arthur A. Leff, The
Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2082 (1985).
179. See James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield’s Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949,
1950–53 (1988).
180. See id. at 1951; Leff, supra note 178, at 2083. Thus, an action for covenant was unavailable for a significant number of disputes involving breach of
promise.
181. See Oldham, supra note 179, at 1952.
182. See Leff, supra note 178, at 2083. James Oldham describes wager of
law as “the ability of the defendant to ‘wage his law’ by bringing to court a
specified number of ‘oath helpers,’ or compurgators, who, under oath, affirmed
defendant’s position that no debt was owed. This ‘wager of law’ automatically
entitled the defendant to prevail.” Oldham, supra note 179, at 1953 n.24 (citing A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 137–44
(1975)). Assumpsit actions originally were encouraged as a means of eliminating the defense of wager of law. See Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep.
676, 678 (K.B.).
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The Court of Chancery stepped into the breach (so to
speak) by providing equitable relief for certain broken promises
and trade disputes.183 The law courts responded to the competition from the Court of Chancery by gradually expanding the
writ system to include the writ in trespass, an action borrowed
from tort law.184 The writ in trespass permitted a plaintiff to
seek compensatory damages for some wrong done to him.185
From the writ in trespass, the English common law eventually
produced the assumpsit action, which by about 1400 had become the basis for recovery for breach of contract.186 As discussed below, breach of contract is the action underlying taxrefund suits. Thus, the very genesis of the action by which a tax
refund may be claimed owes much to equity.
Second, in the assumpsit action, which preceded the development of the action for breach of contract, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had made a promise that he failed to perform.187 Originally, assumpsit required an express promise, but
the forces of equity influenced its development. Assumpsit ultimately came to be applied even where there was no explicit
promise or contract.188 Where justice required that the plaintiff
be granted relief, common law judges simply implied a promise
and held the defendant liable on that promise.189 Thus, equity
183. See, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON
LAW 324 (2d ed. 1981).
184. See Oldham, supra note 179, at 1953 (discussing the shortcomings of
debt and covenant, and observing that during the fifteenth century, “Chancery
began to intervene to fill the gaps, and, in jealous response, the law courts
sought a means of expanding the writ system”).
185. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the
Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 69 (1996).
186. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 4.2(1), at 383–84; Oldham, supra note
179, at 1955. As Oldham observes, “It is one of the ironies of English legal history that the classical law of contracts emerged not from the medieval writs
governing ‘expectations of good faith . . . between individual persons’ but from
trespass, a species of tort law.” Oldham, supra note 179, at 1950 (citing J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 263 (2d ed. 1979)).
187. Assumpsit was a legal action, but like its predecessor the writ in trespass, it evolved because the law courts desired to compete with the Court of
Chancery by becoming more “equitable.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 122
(6th ed. 1990); Keeton, supra note 32, at 39–40 (describing how the law courts
expanded their powers based on a rivalry with the Court of Chancery).
188. See J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 53, 54, 58
(1888) (discussing the decline of the “explicit promise” requirement of assumpsit actions).
189. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 4.2(1), at 383 (“Sometimes the contract
would be express, sometimes implied by the parties’ actions, but in either
event a genuine contract.”). Assumpsit actions not only were sustained on the
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affected the development of assumpsit again, permitting an action for breach of contract where a formal contract or promise
was not present.
Third, in some circumstances, an assumpsit action involved
the breach of a promise to pay an antecedent debt.190 Here
again, equity was influential, as the antecedent debt itself
came to be implied based on notions of fairness.191 Thus evolved
the indebitatus assumpsit action,192 which became the form of
assumpsit used for breach of an implied promise to repay an
antecedent debt where that debt was itself implied based on
notions of fairness and equity.193
basis of implied promises or contracts; they often were maintained in the absence of any contract, implied or otherwise. Id. Again, the critical element in
such cases was the necessity to render justice in the face of an inflexible legal
form. As Dobbs has observed, “the assumpsit action also came to be used when
the parties had no contract at all, so long as the plaintiff could convince the
court that he ought to recover something from the defendant as a matter of justice or good conscience.” Id. (emphasis added).
190. In Slade’s Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.), failure to perform
was expanded to include the failure to pay over money owed, a type of nonfeasance that previously could be remedied only by an action in debt. See Oldham, supra note 179, at 1957.
191. See Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and
the Development of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 35, 110 (1983) (“The defendant’s undertaking in indebitatus counts
was expressed as a subsequent promise to pay for an antecedent debt, an expression that in most instances was probably entirely fictional. The common
law courts, recognizing the value of the indebitatus count as an ‘expeditious
remedy,’ promoted its use, while turning a blind eye to the fictional averment
of a subsequent promise.”). The seminal case on this point is Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.), in which the plaintiff, Moses, had endorsed certain notes to Macferlan, who agreed to indemnify Moses on the endorsements. Id. at 676. Notwithstanding his agreement, Macferlan later sued
Moses on his endorsements. Id. The court refused to hear evidence of Macferlan’s agreement to indemnify Moses, and Macferlan prevailed. Id. Moses then
sought to recover the judgment awarded to Macferlan in an indebitatus assumpsit action. Id. at 677. In granting relief to Moses, Lord Mansfield, the
Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench, described the implied debt and
promise as follows: “If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of
natural justice, to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action,
founded in the equity of the plaintiff ’s case, as it were upon a contract.” Id. at
678 (emphasis added). In other words, because under principles of natural justice Macferlan had an obligation to indemnify Moses in accordance with his
agreement, the court implied a debt from Macferlan to Moses. This implied
debt carried with it an assumpsit or promise by Macferlan to pay the indemnity amount, a promise that Macferlan broke when he recovered the indemnity amount from Moses in the earlier action.
192. Indebitatus assumpsit means “being indebted he undertook or promised.” Leff, supra note 178, at 2083.
193. Indebitatus assumpsit would only lie for breach of a duty to pay
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Finally, equity also affected the later extension of the indebitatus assumpsit action to apply not only to contracts or
promises implied in fact, but also to contracts implied in law, or
“quasi-contracts.”194 This led to the use of indebitatus assumpsit to obtain refunds of taxes that had been illegally or erroneously collected.195 As pleading became standardized in the seventeenth century, certain common counts arose under
indebitatus assumpsit, one of which, the count for “money had
and received to the plaintiff ’s use,” became the basis of the
modern tax-refund suit.196
The Court in Stone concluded that, based on its close historical relationship to equity, a tax-refund suit “brought to recover a tax erroneously paid, although an action at law, is equitable in its function.”197 The court noted that the indebitatus
assumpsit action had long been used to recover on rights of an
equitable nature and that such suits were invariably controlled
by equitable principles.198 Based on this pedigree, the Stone
court was free to “do equity” and deny the trustees’ claim for refund.199
C. EQUITABLE DEFENSES TO REFUND SUITS
The most critical implication of the equitable status of a
tax-refund suit is that the action may be defended in equity.200
In Stone, the Supreme Court held, “since, in [a tax-refund] action, the plaintiff must recover by virtue of a right measured by
money. Ames, supra note 188, at 64.
194. Id. at 65–66.
195. See id. (citing City of London v. Goree, (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 192 (K.B.)
(involving an assumpsit action to recover money due by custom)); cf. Leff, supra note 178, at 2083 (discussing the evolution of indebitatus assumpsit).
196. See Estate of Mueller v. Comm’r, 153 F.3d 302, 304 (6th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937)).
197. Stone, 301 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
198. Id.; see also United States v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402–03
(1933) (“[The assumpsit action] is often called an equitable action and is less
restricted and fettered by technical rules and formalities than any other form
of action . . . . It approaches nearer to a bill in equity than any other common
law action.”); Champ Spring Co. v. United States, 47 F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1931)
(“While [the tax-refund suit] is an action at law, it is nevertheless governed by
equitable principles.”).
199. Stone, 301 U.S. at 537 (“[T]he fact that the petitioners and their beneficiary must be regarded as distinct legal entities for purposes of the assessment and collection of taxes does not deprive the court of its equity powers or
alter the equitable principles which govern the type of action which petitioners
have chosen for the assertion of their claim.”).
200. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.1(3), at 57.
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equitable standards, it follows that it is open to the defendant
to show any state of facts which, according to those standards,
would deny the right.”201 Similarly, in a case decided the same
day as Stone, the Supreme Court held that a tax-refund suit
permits the Commissioner to secure “a final adjudication of his
right to withhold the overpayment . . . on the ground that other
taxes are due from the taxpayer, or that upon other grounds he
is not equitably entitled to the refund.”202 Thus, in a refund suit,
the IRS has the entire range of equitable defenses at its disposal.
Equity is grounded in a rich tradition of equitable maxims.203 The various equitable defenses that populate federal
case law are derived from those maxims.204 Given the procedural posture of refund claims for taxes paid on fraudulently
inflated earnings, not all equitable defenses would be applicable.205 Three equitable defenses, however, seem particularly
201. Stone, 301 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added); see also Davis v. United
States, 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 13,195, at 87,274 (D. Tex. 1977) (“The Supreme Court [in Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932)] . . . felt that an
action for refund was an equitable action . . . and therefore equitable defenses
should also apply.”).
202. United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543
(1937) (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932)
(holding that even where a statute of limitations bars assessment and collection of additional tax, the government may retain payments already received if
such amounts might have been properly assessed and collected).
203. In his seminal book on equity, Keeton lists thirteen such maxims. See
KEETON, supra note 32, at 89.
204. For example, the equitable maxim, “He who comes into Equity must
come with clean hands,” is the basis for the doctrine of unclean hands. See
KEETON, supra note 32, at 87–117 (discussing equitable defenses). Similarly,
the equitable maxim “Delay defeats equities” gave rise to the doctrine of laches. See id.
205. The more important equitable defenses include the following: (1) Equitable Tolling permits a plaintiff to file suit after the running of the statute of
limitations if, despite diligent effort, she cannot determine whether she has a
viable claim. See Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1999);
Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.
1999). (2) Equitable Estoppel precludes one party from asserting a claim
against another party who has detrimentally altered her position in reliance
on the first party’s misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. See
Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 418 (7th Cir. 1992). (3) Equitable Recoupment allows a taxpayer to recoup or offset previously overpaid taxes
against current taxes where the statute of limitations on a refund claim has
run, if the two taxes arose out of the same transaction and were assessed on
inconsistent legal theories. See Estate of Branson v. Comm’r, 264 F.3d 904,
909 (9th Cir. 2001). (4) Doctrine of Laches denies relief where the defendant
has been prejudiced by the plaintiff ’s failure to diligently prosecute his claim.
See Zelazny v. Lyng, 853 F.2d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 1988). (5) Quasi-Estoppel, like
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apposite to claims for refunds of tax paid on fraudulently inflated earnings: the doctrine of unclean hands, equitable estoppel, and quasi-estoppel.
1. The Doctrine of Unclean Hands
One of the most familiar equitable maxims is that one who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. The maxim is
more than a “mere banality”; it is the underpinning of the doctrine of unclean hands, which may be an absolute bar to recovery in a tax-refund suit.206 The Supreme Court has described
the doctrine as an “ordinance that closes the doors of a court of
equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative
to the matter in which he seeks relief.”207 The doctrine is rooted
in the historical notion of the court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good
faith.208 Under the unclean hands doctrine, a court sitting in
equity has wide-ranging discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant, and it is not bound by formula or restrained by
any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise
of discretion.209
The essence of the doctrine is the denial of equitable relief
to a plaintiff who commits a wrong in the same transaction in
which he claims to have been injured.210 For example, in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
equitable estoppel, precludes a plaintiff from asserting a claim against a defendant, where the plaintiff has taken inconsistent positions, but does not require misrepresentation or concealment by the plaintiff or detrimental reliance by the defendant. See Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d
368, 371 (5th Cir. 1990). (6) Doctrine of Unclean Hands prevents relief to a
plaintiff who is a wrongdoer in the same transaction in which he claims to
have been injured. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). (7) Unjust Enrichment prevents a defendant
from retaining a benefit which has come to her at the expense of the plaintiff.
See Vanacore v. Kennedy, 86 F. Supp. 2d 42, 52 (D. Conn. 1998). (8) Promissory Estoppel enforces a promise made without consideration if the promisee
detrimentally relied on the promise and such reliance could reasonably have
been expected by the promisor. See Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr.,
87 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 1996).
206. Lampenfield v. Internal Revenue Serv., 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,038, at 87,161, 87,166 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
207. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814.
208. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc.,
291 F.2d 471, 474 (5th Cir. 1961).
209. Lampenfield, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH), at 87,161, 87,166 (discussing
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1933)).
210. Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1462 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Machinery Co., the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract involving certain patents that it knew were fraudulent at the time
the contract was executed.211 The Supreme Court declined to
enforce the contract, holding that the plaintiff ’s conduct in failing to disclose the patent fraud to the U.S. Patent Office did not
“conform to minimum ethical standards and [did] not justify
[plaintiff]’s . . . attempt to assert and enforce . . . perjurytainted patents and contracts.”212
It is not necessary that the misconduct giving rise to application of the doctrine be punishable as a crime or otherwise be
legally actionable.213 Any willful act transgressing equitable
standards of conduct is sufficient cause for invocation of the
doctrine, as the language of the Court in Precision Instrument
suggests.214 By the same token, the doctrine of unclean hands
clearly applies where the plaintiff ’s act consists of a direct violation of a statute.215 In addition, the equitable or statutory violation must be closely related to the matter being litigated.
Courts will apply the doctrine only where the plaintiff ’s act in
some measure affects the equitable relations between the parties regarding the issue brought before the court for adjudication.216 Although the “broad” form of the conduct standard217 is
sufficient to constitute unclean hands, it could raise thorny
questions as to the scope of “minimum ethical standards.”
Therefore, this Article proposes adopting a “narrow” form of the
conduct standard. In other words, a refund claim would be
summarily denied only if the taxpayer had directly violated a
statute connected with the matter in litigation.
211. 324 U.S. 806, 818–20 (1945).
212. Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
213. See N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 474.
214. 324 U.S. at 815; see also N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 474.
215. See Metro Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 339 F.3d 746, 750–
51 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Well-accepted general principles of equity support [plaintiff ’s] contention that a statutory violation gives a party unclean hands.”); In
re Estate of Bruner, 338 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (unlawful or inequitable conduct, defrauding the government); Promac, Inc. v. West, 203 F.3d
786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (violation of federal regulations); Smith v. World Ins.
Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1463 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[E]quity, under the general maxim
that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands, will refuse its aid to a
litigant who violates a statute directly connected with the matter in litigation.”); Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., No. 86-G-0911-S, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12041, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 1987) (illegal conduct).
216. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245
(1933).
217. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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Finally, an important consideration in the application of
the doctrine of unclean hands, and indeed, in the application of
all of the equitable defenses, is the resulting effect on public
policy.218 When a suit in equity relates to the public interest,
the doctrine of unclean hands assumes wider and more significant proportions because application of the doctrine to deny relief not only resolves a private injustice, it also has the potential to avert an injury to the public.219 For example, in Precision
Instrument, the Supreme Court observed that the possession
and assertion of patent rights were “issues of great moment to
the public” and assessed the claims at issue against public, as
well as private, standards of equity.220 Therefore, the Court’s
ultimate refusal to enforce the plaintiff ’s patent claims supported the public interest in seeing that patents, and the monopolies inherent in them, be limited to their proper scope and
be granted in an environment free of fraudulent conduct.221
In a situation like WorldCom’s, each of the requisite elements of the doctrine of unclean hands is present. WorldCom
sought equitable relief in the form of a refund of excess taxes
paid.222 However, the company committed a wrong in the very
transaction in which it claims to have been injured, the paradigm case for application of the doctrine of unclean hands.
WorldCom directly violated § 7206,223 and thus satisfies the
narrow form of the conduct standard. There is no need to inquire into whether WorldCom also breached standards of ethical conduct, although it clearly did.
The WorldCom situation also meets the requirement that
the doctrine of unclean hands be applied only where the plaintiff ’s act (here, the violation of § 7206) is closely related to the
matter being litigated. Had WorldCom not filed fraudulent tax
returns for the years in question in violation of § 7206, no excess tax would have been paid, and there would be no need for
the company to commence litigation to obtain a tax refund.

218. Public policy is discussed here as a consideration in the traditional
equitable defenses. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of public policy as a
free-standing, equity-flavored doctrine.
219. See Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492–94 (1942); N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 291 F.2d at 474.
220. 324 U.S. at 816 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944) (internal quotations omitted)).
221. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 816.
222. See Blumenstein et al., supra note 15.
223. I.R.C. § 7206 (2000).
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Thus, WorldCom’s fraud measurably “affect[s] the equitable relations between the parties” regarding the tax-refund claim.224
Denying WorldCom’s equitable claim for a tax refund in
such circumstances also comports with the public policy aspect
of the unclean hands doctrine. The integrity and accuracy of all
federal income tax returns is no less important to the public
than the possession and assertion of patent rights, which the
Court in Precision Instrument held to be of “great moment to
the public.”225 Courts have frequently noted the strong public
policy interest in the accurate reporting of income.226
2. Equitable Estoppel
Estoppel is a term used widely in the law, which, in its
most general sense, refers to the situation in which a party is
precluded or “stopped” from taking some action or making some
argument or claim.227 The preclusion may result from a prior,
overriding rule or claim, or, as in the case of “equitable” estoppel, it may result from considerations of fairness and justice.228
Thus, the doctrine of unclean hands discussed in the previous
section is a species of equitable estoppel, precluding equitable
relief where the party seeking it has done wrong in the particular transaction. The doctrine is rooted in concerns of public policy, fair dealing, common honesty, good faith, and justice.229
Equitable estoppel differs from the unclean hands doctrine
in that it prevents a party from asserting a claim against another party who has detrimentally altered her position in reli224. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933).
225. 324 U.S. at 815–16 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 246
(internal quotations omitted)); see also Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488, 492–94 (1942).
226. See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
227. See DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.3(5), at 64–65.
228. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984) (“Estoppel
is an equitable doctrine invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases.”);
Readco, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 301 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Equitable estoppel is imposed by law in the interest of fairness to prevent the enforcement of rights which would work fraud or injustice upon the person
against whom enforcement is sought and who, in justifiable reliance upon the
opposing party’s words or conduct, has been misled into acting upon the belief
that such enforcement would not be sought.”); Melrose Assocs., L.P. v. United
States, 43 Fed. Cl. 124, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1999) (“The doctrine of equitable estoppel
is a judicial remedy by which a party may be precluded by its own act or omission, from asserting a right to which it otherwise would have been entitled.”).
229. E.g., Hilco Prop. Servs. v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 526, 539 (D.
N.H. 1996).
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ance on the first party’s misrepresentation.230 Where the elements of equitable estoppel apply, a party is absolutely barred
from asserting a right that under other circumstances would be
indisputable.231 In this way, a party is prevented from taking
unconscionable advantage of her own wrong by asserting her
strict legal rights.232
The elements of equitable estoppel vary somewhat from
court to court, but the oft-cited list in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Armistead v. Vernitron Corp. is representative, and includes the following:
(1) conduct or language amounting to a representation of material
fact; (2) awareness of the true facts by the party to be estopped; (3) an
intention on the part of the party to be estopped that the representation be acted on, or conduct toward the party asserting the estoppel
such that the latter has a right to believe that the former’s conduct is
so intended; (4) unawareness of the true facts by the party asserting
the estoppel; and (5) detrimental and justifiable reliance on the representation by the party asserting estoppel.233

In addition to these elements, there are some additional
considerations in the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Most importantly for its application to tax-refund
claims, the doctrine is available for both legal and equitable
claims.234 Whereas the doctrine of unclean hands applies to equitable or equity-like actions, equitable estoppel is subject to no

230. Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992); see also
Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir.
2001); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1982).
231. Hilco Prop. Servs., 929 F. Supp. at 540 (stating that equitable estoppel
“prevents the assertion of what would otherwise be an unequivocal right”)
(quoting 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 33 (1966)).
232. Plymouth Foam Prods. v. City of Becker, 120 F.3d 153, 157 (8th Cir.
1997).
233. Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1991); see
also Lehman v. United States, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 1998); Burdine v. Dow Chemical Co., 923 F.2d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Arkansas law); Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982)
(adopting elements listed in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in TRW, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 647 F.2d 942, 950–51 (9th Cir. 1981)).
234. See Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The
federal doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to actions brought in federal
courts at law and equity.” (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S.
231, 232–33 (1959))); DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.3(5), at 66 (“Equitable estoppel originated in decisions of equity courts, as its name implies; but it has long
since ‘worked over’ into law. This means that estoppel, when established, affects not only equitable remedies, but also legal remedies.”).
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such limitations.235 Thus, it may be raised as a defense to taxrefund claims without relying on the historically equitable nature of such claims.
Another consideration in the application of equitable estoppel is that it should operate always as a shield and never as
a sword.236 In other words, equitable estoppel does not work as
a positive gain to a party,237 but rather serves to prevent a loss
that otherwise would occur by strict application of the law.238 It
should not be applied beyond what is necessary to “promote the
ends of justice” and “accomplish that which ought to be done
between [the parties].”239
The first four elements of equitable estoppel as enumerated by the Sixth Circuit in Armistead v. Vernitron Corp. are
clearly satisfied in a tax-refund situation like that of WorldCom’s. WorldCom made a representation on its federal income
tax return of a material fact—its taxable income—while being
aware that its true income was in fact much less.240 WorldCom’s false representation of its income on a document executed under penalty of perjury was conduct calculated to induce
the IRS to “act” by accepting the income tax return as a true
and accurate statement of its income and tax liability, and
foregoing enforcement action for failure to file a correct tax return.241 Of course, the IRS was unaware of WorldCom’s true income, since the federal income tax system relies on taxpayers to
apprise the government of their tax obligations through selfreporting.
The fifth element of equitable estoppel is detrimental reliance by the party asserting the estoppel. The case law in this
area requires detriment, injury, or prejudice to the party claiming the estoppel.242 Moreover, the prejudice or injury involved
235. DOBBS, supra note 159, § 2.3(5), at 66.
236. E.g., Lacy v. United States, 216 F.2d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1954); Arnold
& Assocs., Inc. v. Misys Healthcare Sys., 275 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1023 (D. Ariz.
2003).
237. G.S. Johnson Co. v. Nev. Packard Mines Co., 272 F. 291, 309 (D. Nev.
1920).
238. The Tampico v. Crossett W. Lumber Co., 270 F. 537, 542 (9th Cir.
1921).
239. Cook v. Ball, 144 F.2d 423, 438 (7th Cir. 1944).
240. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
241. See United States v. Rayor, 204 F. Supp. 486, 492 (S.D. Cal. 1962) (observing that the government has a right to believe, before acting on a return,
that the return truthfully reflects the taxpayer’s income and expenditures).
242. Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1167 (7th Cir. 1982) (quot-
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must be “actual and material or substantial, and not merely
technical or formal.”243 In WorldCom’s case, the IRS clearly relied on the false representations contained in the company’s tax
return. The question is whether there was a corresponding detriment to the IRS since there was an overpayment of tax rather
than a tax deficiency.244 As discussed in Part II.B, the courts
have answered that question affirmatively.245 In Badaracco246
and Goldman,247 the courts discussed the specific detriment to
the government caused by the filing of false returns, including
increasing its administrative burdens, hindering the verification of the taxpayer’s correct tax liability, and undermining
voluntary compliance. These are “actual” rather than merely
“technical” harms, and they should be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Moreover,
because estoppel in this situation would redress actual harms
to the government, its function would be that of a shield rather
than a sword.
In sum, equitable estoppel presents a viable defense that
the government may assert to deny a refund claim where tax
fraud is involved. Unlike the defense of unclean hands, it may
be raised as a defense against legal as well as equitable claims.
However, the need to establish detrimental reliance makes it
somewhat weaker than the unclean hands defense.
3. Quasi-Estoppel
Closely related to equitable estoppel is the doctrine of
quasi-estoppel, sometimes referred to as the “duty of consistency.”248 This doctrine precludes a party from asserting, to another’s disadvantage, a right that is inconsistent with a position he has previously taken. “The doctrine applies when it
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from
which he accepted a benefit.”249 In general, the elements of
ing United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1966))
(requiring substantial injury from reliance).
243. See 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 78 (1966).
244. Of course, in the circumstances addressed by this Article there never
would be a tax deficiency, since a tax deficiency would not give rise to either a
refund claim or a need to deny that claim on grounds of equity.
245. See supra notes 100–13 and accompanying text.
246. Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398–400 (1984).
247. United States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
248. Estate of Letts v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 290, 296 (1997).
249. Stinnett v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 227 F.3d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 2000);
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quasi-estoppel are (1) a party’s taking of a position and the acceptance of the benefits of that position, and (2) the party’s subsequent taking of an inconsistent position to avoid corresponding obligations or effects of the initial position.250 In tax cases,
courts sometimes have included the additional element of an
expired statute of limitations. Thus, in Beltzer v. United States,
the elements were:
(1) the taxpayer has made a representation or reported an item for
tax purposes in one year, (2) the Commissioner has acquiesced in or
relied on that fact for that year, and (3) the taxpayer desires to
change the representation, previously made, in a later year after the
statute of limitations on assessments bars adjustments for the initial
tax year.251

The third element in the latter formulation highlights the
situation where inconsistent positions would permit a taxpayer
to “whipsaw” the IRS.252
Beltzer v. United States provides an example of the application of quasi-estoppel in the tax context. In that case, the taxpayer inherited shares of stock that had been undervalued on

see also Long v. Turner, 134 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1998). A critical difference
between equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel is that the latter does not require a showing of either a misrepresentation by one party or reliance on that
misrepresentation by the other party. Long, 134 F.3d at 318.
250. E.g., VT, Inc. v. Geico Ins. Co., No. 3:03-CV-0522-P, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11849, at *24 (N.D. Tex. June 16, 2004); see also Alamo Nat’l Bank v.
Comm’r, 95 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938).
251. 495 F.2d 211, 212 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Griffith v. United States,
71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9280, at 86,084 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Harvey &
McMillan v. United States, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9720, at 93,838 (S.D.
W. Va. 1964); Estate of Letts, 109 T.C. at 296 (1997).
252. The Fifth Circuit discussed the “whipsaw” dilemma as follows:
In income taxation what is done in one tax year is sometimes projected into another where the same fact must govern. There being
continuity, there ought to be consistency in treatment. If, for instance,
a sale is made on deferred payments, and the taxpayer returns it as
an installment sale, charging himself only with the cash collection,
and the Commissioner acquiesces, the taxpayer could not in later
years refuse to pay on the deferred collections by asserting that he
stated the facts wrongly in the first instance and ought to have paid
on all then, unless he should offer to correct also the first tax settlement. So if a taxpayer who acquired gain in an exchange of property
sets up as its measure a value of what he received in which the Commissioner acquiesces, that value is the basis to be taken in measuring
a further gain on a sale of the property in a later year. The taxpayer
cannot say: “I was mistaken. The value was many times what I said it
was. I therefore realized less gain on the last sale,” without doing justice all around in correcting his mistake.
Alamo Nat’l Bank, 95 F.2d at 623.
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the decedent’s estate tax return.253 When the taxpayer sold the
shares several years later for an amount considerably greater
than the value reflected in the estate tax return, he argued that
his adjusted basis in the shares, for purposes of calculating the
capital gain on the sale, should have been greater than the
value reflected in the estate tax return.254 The higher basis
would have reduced the tax paid on the sale, for which the taxpayer sought a refund.255 The IRS invoked the doctrine of
quasi-estoppel to deny the taxpayer’s refund claim and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the government’s position, holding that
the taxpayer could not assign stock a low value for purposes of
determining the estate tax due, and later, when the statute of
limitations had run on the collection of the estate tax, change
that value so as to reduce the amount of capital gains tax due
on the sale of the stock.256
Quasi-estoppel, although presenting fewer requirements
for its application, is a bit more awkward to employ in the case
of refund claims for fraudulently inflated income tax than the
doctrines of unclean hands or equitable estoppel, at least as the
doctrine has developed in the area of tax law. The fraudulent
inflation of one’s tax liability is counterintuitive and as a result,
the relevant statutes and legal doctrines are ill-suited to deal
with such cases.257 Nevertheless, quasi-estoppel offers the IRS
yet another possible equitable defense to payment of refund
claims in cases such as WorldCom’s.
First, the Commissioner relied on WorldCom’s assertion
that its income was some $11 billion more than it really was.258
Although this position cost the company additional taxes, it
permitted WorldCom to represent to its investors that it was
thriving when, in fact, it was teetering on the edge of financial
ruin. This benefit clearly had monetary value to the company
measured by the amount of the taxes that it paid.259 WorldCom
subsequently sought to change the representation that it had
previously made (namely, that its income was $11 billion more

253. Beltzer, 495 F.2d at 212.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 212–13. For a similar case, see Alamo Nat’l Bank, 95 F.2d at
623.
257. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text (regarding I.R.C.
§ 6663 (2000)).
258. See Young, supra note 17.
259. See Erickson et al., supra note 61, at 388, 391.
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than it actually was) so as to avoid the consequences of that
earlier position (namely, the permanent loss of the taxes paid
on the inflated income). All that is missing is an expired statute
of limitations. This should not be fatal, however. As noted
above, the expired statute of limitations element simply describes one situation in the tax law in which the IRS potentially
may be whipsawed and where the application of quasi-estoppel
is particularly apposite.260 The benefit WorldCom enjoyed,
unlike a reduction in taxes, does not become fixed upon the expiration of a statute of limitations. Moreover, the two elements
of the traditional version of quasi-estoppel would be satisfied,
and there does not appear to be any authority that suggests the
tax version must be used exclusively in tax-related cases.
In short, to successfully assert the equitable defense of
quasi-estoppel to WorldCom’s tax-refund claim, the IRS would
need only show that WorldCom benefited from the position it
took on its federal income tax returns, and that it now seeks to
change that position in order to avoid the consequences it entails.261 Given the facts of the case, such a showing is easily
made.
D. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
As noted in the preceding discussion of the various equitable defenses, a primary concern of equity is public policy.262
That is, does public policy demand the application of the particular equitable defense, and if that defense is applied, what
will be the effect on public policy? But apart from its relationship to specific equitable defenses, public policy presents
broader issues that may affect the use of equity as proposed in
this Article. Some of these issues are addressed under the three
broad headings in the remainder of this Part III.
1. Rules v. Standards
The history of the development of equity, as described in
Part III.B, reflects the ongoing tension between judge-made law
(equity) on the one hand, and statutory rules (common law) on
the other. While the tax law does not want for statutory rules,
260. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
261. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d 368, 371 (5th Cir.
1990) (explaining that to establish quasi-estoppel, one must show that the
party to be estopped “can be equitably charged with choosing to accept benefits
in a manner genuinely inconsistent with his subsequent claim”).
262. See supra notes 218–21 and accompanying text.
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it has been significantly shaped by judge-made law.263 For example, in the 1930s it was a judicial move away from formalism
in the tax law that culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Gregory v. Helvering.264 In that case, the court first articulated the business purpose doctrine, a “standard” that permits
the denial of favored tax treatment for transactions that lack
sufficient business purpose.265 An equally influential judgemade standard was articulated four decades later by the Supreme Court in Knetsch v. United States.266 That standard, the
well-known “economic substance doctrine,” permits a transaction to be disregarded if there is no economic substance to the
transaction beyond the tax benefit sought.267
Although the debate is not over, where tax law is concerned, standards such as these are seen by some scholars as
superior to rules in many respects.268 The principal reason is
that standards do not require frequent amendment to adapt to
incremental change.269 This view has been reinforced recently
263. See Likhovski, supra note 172, at 980.
264. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
265. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 (describing the purported corporate reorganization in the case as “[s]imply an operation having no business or corporate
purpose—a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as
a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner”).
266. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
267. Id. at 366.
268. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 57
(1990) (“A society in as much [legal] ferment as ours needs a mechanism for
legal change, and it is not obvious that the combination that predominates in
federal income taxation—extremely detailed statutory specifications with frequent amendments and continuous executive rule making—is always to be
preferred to judicial administration of flexible standards.”); David A. Weisbach, Costs of Departures from Formalism: Formalism in Tax Law, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 860, 860 (1999) (“[O]ver the last several years, the purely rule-oriented
approach to the tax law has begun to be perceived as a failure.”). But see Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992) (arguing that if cases are anticipated to arise frequently and have important recurring characteristics, as is the case with tax law, rules will not
only be preferable, but might be expected to be more precise).
269. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 590 (5th ed.
1998) (“To control behavior through a set of detailed rules rather than through
a general standard involves costs . . . in revising the rules to keep them
abreast of changing conditions; as we have noted, a specific rule will obsolesce
more rapidly than a general standard.”); Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and
the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 673 (1969) (recognizing, over three decades ago, the
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in assessing the problem of abusive corporate tax shelters.270
Attempts to shut down tax shelters with rules simply result in
new avoidance maneuvers, which in turn require additional
rules that are again exploited, and so on.271 An anti-avoidance
standard, by contrast, is adaptable to transactions as they mutate.272 To illustrate with an example, following the Knetsch decision,273 Congress enacted a rule to prevent the transaction
employed by Knetsch—namely, the deduction of interest paid
in connection with tax-deferred annuities.274 The rule was effective for that transaction but, unlike the economic substance
standard articulated by the Court, was useless in addressing
subsequent variations of the transaction, such as corporateowned life insurance, which surfaced in the early 1990s.
The point here is that the use of equitable defenses as a
means of denying tax-refund claims in earnings-inflation cases,
like the use of standards in other contexts, may well be preferable to a legislative enactment that would increase the penalty
applicable to fraudulent returns.275 In the particular context of
§ 7206,276 equitable defenses would share with the legislative
approach the advantages of addressing the overpayment issue
not contemplated by the original penalty and of imposing a
penalty that would not likely become obsolete by virtue of inflation or similar factors.277 Unlike the legislative solution, however, equitable defenses would not be susceptible to obsolescence as tax fraud evolves.
value of standards in managing the complexity of tax law).
270. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV.
215, 247–48 (2002).
271. See Surrey, supra note 269, at 686 (“[R]ules in turn bring about new
frontiers of interpretation and maneuver, which are settled by new statutory
rules, again creating new frontiers. The tax universe is indeed limitless, with
no frontier ever providing a finite boundary.”).
272. There have been several attempts to codify the economic substance
doctrine, most recently in the Senate’s version of the legislation that became
the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The economic substance provision,
along with the increased penalty that would cover tax fraud involving overstatements of income, was dropped in conference. Compare S. 1637, 108th
Cong. § 425 (2004) with American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108357, 118 Stat. 1418.
273. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
274. I.R.C. § 264(a)(4) (2000).
275. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text (discussing efforts by
the Senate to increase fraudulent overpayment penalties).
276. I.R.C. § 7206 (2000).
277. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing penalty
amounts).
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One trade-off in adopting standards over rules is the diminished certainty that accompanies vaguer, judge-made
law.278 The use of equitable defenses in denying a fraud-related
refund claim in a case like WorldCom’s, for example, would establish a new precedent. It would initially create some uncertainty as taxpayers evaluate whether the denial would likely be
repeated in other cases, and if so, under what specific sets of
circumstances. Viewed ex ante, WorldCom could not have
known that its refund claim would be denied based on thenestablished precedent. This, of course, is the ultimate in uncertainty. On the other hand, equitable principles are generally
well established and well known, and their application in this
context should not be wholly unexpected.279 Moreover, as
precedent is developed for the use of equity in this context, certainty and predictability will likely increase.280
2. The “Innocent Investor”
One could construct a public policy argument that suggests
it would be unfair for the IRS to retain tax overpayments that
otherwise might be used to mitigate damages suffered by innocent creditors and shareholders of a corporation that had inflated earnings. After all, the direct cost of any penalty generally will be borne by shareholders in addition to the potential
indirect costs associated with the penalty.281 There are three
responses to this argument. First, both creditors and shareholders assume the risks of their investments in a corporation,
including risks related to the behavior of management.282
278. But see Weisbach, supra note 270, at 247–48 (arguing that the effects
of uncertainty are difficult to predict and may, in fact, be positive).
279. In fact, the permanent loss of the $300 million it paid in taxes should
not have been a surprise to WorldCom at all. Because a refund claim generally
must be filed within three years from the time the return was filed, WorldCom
must have expected either to forfeit the taxes paid or admit within two years
that it had inflated its taxable income. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
280. See Kaplow, supra note 268, at 611 (“To the extent laws are promulgated as standards, predictability will be enhanced by precedent to the extent
precedent transforms standards into rules.”).
281. Christopher Kennedy, Criminal Sentences for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 443, 448–49 (1985).
282. Id. at 452–53 (“[W]hile the possibility of large fines introduces an
added element of risk into the shareholder’s investment, shareholders are
uniquely situated to neutralize risk through diversification. What is more, this
risk will have been reflected in lower share prices when the investor bought
his shares. Hence the view that shareholders are ‘innocent’ should be no bar to
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Sometimes the assumption of these risks is rewarded; sometimes investors are penalized.283 Both creditors and shareholders can reduce the risk associated with unlawful conduct of
managers in one firm by investing in many others.284 Moreover,
under general corporate law, the shareholder enjoys immunity
from personal liability for the actions of corporate management
even when those actions injure third parties, including creditors.285
A second response is that a refund retained by the Treasury, as proposed in this Article, is in the nature of a penalty because it is retained as a result of the taxpayer’s fraudulent conduct. The denial of a tax refund by the IRS differs from an
outright penalty only in that it is imposed by a court out of considerations of equity in the particular case, rather than as a
matter of positive statutory law. Penalties routinely are imposed on corporations without consideration of their impact on
innocent shareholders.286 As a matter of policy, penalties for
corporate wrongdoing ought not to be waived simply because
shareholders were not directly involved in the wrongdoing.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would preclude
imposition of virtually all monetary penalties on publicly
traded corporations since shareholders bear the costs of such
penalties but rarely are involved in management activities,
fraudulent or not.
fines that eliminate the prospective profit in criminal conduct.”). Creditors
face more risk than shareholders because they generally lack the opportunity
to profit from corporate malfeasance. See id. at 452. However, creditors may
attempt to manage these risks through covenants and other restrictions.
283. Shareholders often benefit from the crime of managers, as did WorldCom shareholders who sold stock during the run-up in the company’s stock
price. Since they bear no personal responsibility for management’s criminal
activity, shareholders have little incentive to hire managers willing to adhere
to the law. See POSNER, supra note 269, at 464.
284. See Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 320 (1991) (observing that shareholders
“can reduce the risk associated with individual stock holdings in particular
firms by owning a fully diversified portfolio of securities”).
285. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2005) (stating that unless a
corporation’s certificate of incorporation contains a statement providing to the
contrary, “stockholders . . . of a corporation shall not be personally liable for
the payment of the corporation’s debts except as they may be liable by reason
of their own conduct or acts”).
286. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the 13th
Annual Public Fund Boards Forum: The Challenges of Striking a Regulatory
Balance (Dec. 6, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120604cag.htm
(expressing concern over the trend of increasing corporate penalties that too
often hurt the investors that the SEC is supposed to protect).
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Finally, a no-refund policy would be beneficial to shareholders to the extent that it creates incentives for corporations
to accurately report earnings. A corporation facing the potential
forfeiture of all federal income taxes paid on inflated earnings
is more likely to impose stricter internal controls to prevent
earnings inflation and the concomitant tax fraud, than is a corporation facing a maximum penalty of a few hundred thousand
dollars.
3. Penalty Optimality
A third matter of public policy concern is the extent to
which the use of equitable defenses to deny refund claims results in the effective imposition of an optimal penalty. Although
the rationality and, thus, the efficacy of the current tax penalty
system have been criticized, few would dispute that tax penalties are necessary to insure substantial compliance with the tax
laws.287 To achieve such compliance, the congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation has recommended that tax penalties
“(1) encourage voluntary compliance, (2) operate fairly, (3) deter undesired behavior, and (4) be designed in a manner that
promotes efficient and effective administration of the provisions
by the IRS.”288 These elements suggest affecting taxpayer behavior in ways consistent with the collection of tax revenues
and the smooth functioning of the tax system. In other words,
the elements focus on optimality.
The economic model of optimality is familiar. A person presumably will commit a crime if the benefits of doing so exceed
the expected costs to him.289 Thus, if apprehension is certain,
increasing the potential costs associated with the crime by imposing a penalty will deter its commission.290 Of course, appre287. See, e.g., Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of
Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 344 (1989) (observing that tax
penalties are “remarkably crude policy instruments,” but noting that such
penalties discourage illegal or undesirable activity).
288. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 31. The
first and third of these elements seem to be after the same thing (i.e., a penalty can encourage voluntary compliance only to the extent that it deters noncompliance).
289. This analysis is based on Bentham’s theory that an individual will
seek to maximize satisfaction and thus will be deterred from committing a
crime if its costs exceed its benefits. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A.
Hart eds., 1970). There are other theories as well. See Zolt, supra note 287, at
361–62.
290. Deterrence has a particular meaning in the context of corporate crime
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hension is never certain absent a 100 percent audit rate, which
is not possible in an environment of limited government resources. Therefore, the expected cost of a crime is the product of
the penalty imposed and the probability of apprehension and
conviction. Where the probability of apprehension is relatively
low, the expected cost of the crime can be raised by increasing
the amount of the penalty imposed.291 Given that audits are
limited by available government resources, a high-penalty, lowaudit regime is likely to be most administratively efficient, thus
satisfying the fourth characteristic identified by the Joint
Committee.292 The only upper limit on the penalty amount under the economic model is fairness, which is also the second
characteristic recommended by the Joint Committee. Fairness
entails making the penalty proportional to the crime.293 A highpenalty regime may be considered unfair, and compliance will
not be encouraged if the penalty does not appear to fit the
crime.294
By the Joint Committee’s standards, the current tax fraud
penalty is a dismal failure in addressing the filing of fraudulent
returns.295 Given the trivial dollar amount of the fine imposed,296 the current penalty will not deter the filing of fraudulent returns by corporations, to which it clearly is intended to
apply.297 Moreover, the current penalty lacks proportionality
that relates to Bentham’s notion of maximizing satisfaction. Kennedy, supra
note 281, at 450 (“In evaluating the obstacles to a satisfactory rationale for
corporate fines, it is first important to define the sort of deterrence that is
their goal. The word ‘deterrence’ is perhaps misleading in the corporate context, since it connotes crime prevention through fear. But corporate fines deter
not so much through fear as through cancellation of motive. The essence of
fines that eliminate expected gain is simply the neutralization of one of the
stimuli for corporate crime: the profit motive.”).
291. See POSNER, supra note 269, at 242–43 (applying economic analysis to
crime and criminal sanctions); Kennedy, supra, note 281, at 447 (“The fine
must reduce the expected gain of a violation to zero or below, incorporating a
multiplier to counterbalance the possibility that a violation would escape detection.”).
292. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 37.
293. Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535, 570 (1991) (“Penalties for tax offenses should be equitable, and to be equitable, they must be proportional.”).
294. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 37. By the
same token, a penalty that is too low also reflects a lack of proportionality and
will tend to discourage compliance.
295. The criticisms leveled here apply to fraudulent understatements and
overstatements of income and tax.
296. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
297. See I.R.C. § 7206(5) (2000) (specifying the fine amount in the case of
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because it is a fixed dollar amount that applies irrespective of
either the financial circumstances or the culpability of the offender. Thus, the penalty falls more heavily on individual taxpayers filing fraudulent returns than it does on corporations.298
The penalty is not likely to encourage compliance either, since
it lacks proportionality and may therefore be viewed as unfair.
Finally, the penalty is neither administratively efficient nor effective. Minimal revenue is likely to be collected either from the
penalty itself or as a result of the penalty’s effect in deterring
the fraud that the statute proscribes.299
By contrast, consider the denial of a refund claim on the
grounds of equity. The lost refund in some cases will be quite
high. For example, in WorldCom’s case, the penalty likely
would have been around $300 million. Whether any penalty
would have been sufficient to deter the company’s earnings inflation is not clear.300 However, to the extent that earnings inflation can be deterred, a penalty of $300 million is much more
likely to be effective than a likely maximum penalty of
$160,000.301 Where audit probability is low, an increased penalty is necessary to insure that the cost of the crime is sufficiently high to at least potentially have a deterrent effect.302
Thus, the denial of a refund is likely to achieve a greater measure of deterrence than the current penalty.

corporations).
298. Much of the current system of penalties suffers from a lack of proportionality. Zolt, supra note 287, at 345–46.
299. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
300. Arguably, WorldCom executives would not have been deterred by the
possibility that overpaid taxes would not be refundable, if they even considered the question in the first place. In fact, if the corporation expected to conceal its fraud for at least as long as the three-year statute of limitations on refund claims, then the decision to inflate the corporation’s earnings was made
in the face of a prepaid penalty of $300 million. On the other hand, it seems
likely that, in many cases, corporations inflating their earnings do so as a
temporary measure, with the intention of reversing the overstatement in the
future.
301. See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text. Of course, the argument that denying a refund would not deter earnings inflation in some cases
applies with equal force to a penalty of any size that one might impose.
302. See POSNER, supra note 269, at 244 (“If the costs of collecting fines are
assumed to be zero regardless of the size of the fine, the most efficient combination is a probability arbitrarily close to zero and a fine arbitrarily close to
infinity.”). However, the potential penalty imposed on a given corporation in
the form of denying a tax refund is necessarily capped at an amount equal to
the product of the overstated earnings and the corporation’s effective tax rate.

BOISE_3FMT

206

11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:144

As discussed above, the upper limit on a penalty should be
measured by its potential to be perceived as excessive. At first
blush, denying WorldCom a refund of $300 million in taxes
paid on phony income might be viewed as not proportional to
the offense. Of course, in real terms, the denial of the refund
would be exactly proportional to the offense because it would be
measured directly by the amount of WorldCom’s fraudulent
overstatement of its tax liability. Even weighed against the potential harm caused by WorldCom’s tax fraud, though, it is not
clear that the denial of a refund would be excessive. A fine of
$300 million certainly is large, but it failed to shock the conscience of the U.S. Senate, which voted unanimously for legislation that would have imposed just such a fine.303 Perjury in its
various forms has always been considered one of the most odious of criminal offenses.304 It was punishable by death under
the Code of Hammurabi, Roman law, and French law.305 In
more enlightened times, the Supreme Court has called perjury
“an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial
proceedings,” and described “effective restraints against this
type of egregious offense” as “imperative.”306 Moreover, a penalty of 100 percent of an overpayment of tax is not far from the
currently applicable civil penalty of 75 percent of any understatement of tax attributable to fraud.307 Considering that no

303. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. Historically, many corporate fines have been absurdly low, and a number of legislatures are moving
toward fines that reflect some multiple of the gain from prohibited conduct.
See Kennedy, supra note 281, at 453 n.41.
304. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How
Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 157, 174–75 (2001).
305. See Bennett L. Gershman, The “Perjury Trap”, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624,
636 (1981). Putting aside the death penalty for the moment, the seriousness
with which perjury is viewed is not unwarranted given the necessity for truth
in human dealings. As one moral philosopher has said, “trust in some degree
of veracity functions as a foundation of relations among human beings; when
this trust shatters or wears away, institutions collapse.” SISSELA BOK, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 31 (Vintage Books 1989) (1978).
306. Gershman, supra note 305, at 636 n.44 (citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976)).
307. I.R.C. § 6663 (2000). The Supreme Court has determined that the civil
fraud penalty is not even punitive, but rather is a “remedial sanction” provided primarily for revenue protection and to reimburse the government for
the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer’s
fraud. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401 (1938) (construing a 50
percent fraud penalty).
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interest would attach to the amount owed, as would be the case
in a typical underpayment situation, denial of a refund does not
appear unduly punitive.
The denial of a refund also achieves administrative efficiency and effectiveness. It is administratively simple, requiring only determination of the amount of the refund that is
sought and verification as to whether the refund arose in connection with earnings inflation.308 Further, the denial of refunds would yield significant returns on audit resources expended. In sum, the denial of refund claims in tax fraud cases
involving inflated earnings is likely to have a greater deterrent
effect, encourage compliance to a greater degree, be perceived
as more fair, and be more administratively efficient and effective than the current penalty regime.
IV. APPLYING EQUITY TO REFUND CLAIMS
So far, this Article has assessed the scope of the earningsinflation problem and its impact on tax reporting, examined the
inadequacy of existing penalties to effectively discourage tax
fraud related to earnings inflation, reviewed both the equitable
pedigree of tax-refund claims and the equitable defenses that
might be asserted in response to such claims, and discussed
various relevant public policy issues. The remainder of the Article discusses how the IRS can establish the connection between earnings inflation on the one hand, and a claim for refund of taxes paid on the inflated earnings on the other. This
part of the Article concludes with an assessment of the roles of
both the IRS and the Joint Committee in asserting equitable
defenses to refund claims.
A. ESTABLISHING THE TAX-FRAUD CONNECTION
Until recently, no simple mechanism existed for determining whether a particular refund claim was linked to earnings
inflation and therefore should be denied. That is, there was no
easy way of linking a given tax-refund claim to fraudulent activity on the part of the corporate taxpayer that might give rise
to an equitable defense to the claim. In a case such as WorldCom’s, where the accounting fraud was widely reported by the

308. The administration of refunds under this approach is discussed in
greater detail in infra Part IV.
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media, the IRS could, of course, ferret out the tax fraud that
masked the earnings inflation. However, not all cases would
necessarily be as publicly visible.
Fortunately, this knowledge gap will be eliminated for tax
years ending on or after December 31, 2004. In an effort to increase the transparency of corporate tax return filings in general, Treasury and the IRS have issued Schedule M-3, which
would replace the current Schedule M-1 on which a corporation
reconciles the difference between its book income and taxable
income.309 Importantly, the new Schedule M-3 asks the reporting corporation whether it has restated its financials for periods covered by the schedule and, if so, requests an explanation
of each item restated.310 This new form will permit the IRS to
establish the necessary nexus between accounting fraud, on the
one hand, and tax fraud, on the other. During IRS processing, a
Schedule M-3 that indicates that earnings were restated in the
year for which the refund is claimed should immediately trigger closer scrutiny.
For example, assume that a company like WorldCom files
an amended return requesting a refund of taxes paid on
fraudulently inflated income. Because the company has to show
on Schedule M-3 that it has restated its earnings, the IRS will
be able to investigate the relationship between the earnings inflation and the refund claim. If the investigation indicates that
the company was engaged in accounting fraud and falsified its
original tax return to conceal the fraud, the IRS should then
impose liability under I.R.C. § 7206(1)311 and deny the refund
claim based on the doctrine of unclean hands or another applicable equitable defense.312
309. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Treasury and IRS Issue
Revised Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns (July 7, 2004), http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124997,00.html; Press Release, Office of
Public Affairs, Treasury Department, Treasury and IRS Issue Final Version of
Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns (Oct. 25, 2004), http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/js2058.htm.
310. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE M-3 (FORM 1120), NET INCOME
(LOSS) RECONCILIATION FOR CORPORATIONS WITH TOTAL ASSETS OF $10 MILLION OR MORE (OMB NO. 1545-0123) 1 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/final_m-3_form_102504.pdf.
311. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2000).
312. Violation of § 7206(1) would constitute the bad conduct needed to support the IRS’s denial of the company’s refund claim based on the defense of
unclean hands. As discussed in supra Part III.C, the doctrine of unclean hands
requires bad conduct on the part of the taxpayer. Although such conduct need
not rise to the level of a statutory violation, such a violation clearly establishes

BOISE_3FMT

2005]

11/22/2005 04:30:44 PM

PLAYING WITH “MONOPOLY MONEY”

209

B. EXPANDING JOINT COMMITTEE REVIEW
A policy of denying certain tax-refund claims on grounds of
equity should reflect the limits of IRS resources by targeting
only sizable tax-refund claims. One approach would be to link
equitable review of tax-refund claims to the existing review of
large refunds that the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation is statutorily required to undertake.313 Under current law,
a refund in excess of $2 million may not be paid until after the
expiration of thirty days from the date on which a report summarizing the proposed refund is submitted for review to the
Joint Committee.314 The report must specify the name of the
person (or entity) to whom the refund or credit is to be made,
the amount of the refund or credit, and a summary of the relevant facts.315 The report mandated by § 6405 is prepared by
that the taxpayer has unclean hands. See supra notes 210–15 and accompanying text.
313. The Joint Committee is comprised of five members of the Senate Finance Committee and five members of the House Ways and Means Committee
(in each case, three of the five are members of the majority party, while two
are members of the minority party). I.R.C. § 8002 (2000). The Joint Committee
was created by Congress in 1926 to exercise oversight of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (the precursor to the IRS). See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No.
69-20, § 1203, 44 Stat. 9, 127–28. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was widely
viewed at the time as serving the interests of the very wealthy at the expense
of ordinary taxpayers. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. S2364 (1927) (statement of Sen.
Heflin) (arguing that through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Republicans
controlled the taxing power of the nation and were using that power to “impoverish the masses and to enrich a favored few”). Senator James Couzens
was rewarded with a notice for more than $10 million in back taxes in response to his public criticism of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for its valuation of oil properties. Recommendations of the National Commission on Restructuring the IRS on Executive Branch Governance and Congressional
Oversight of the IRS: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means H.R.,
105th Cong. 177–78 (statement of Kenneth J. Kies, Chief of Staff, Joint
Comm. on Taxation). Then-Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, who had benefited from the Bureau’s valuation as the principal owner of Gulf Oil, was believed to be responsible for the retaliation. Id. Senator Couzens’s investigation
led to the creation of the Joint Committee. Id.
314. I.R.C. § 6405(a) (2000). Concerned about the integrity of the refund
process, Congress expanded the Joint Committee’s mandate two years after its
creation by requiring that all tax refunds in excess of $75,000 be reported to,
and reviewed by, the Joint Committee before they were paid. See Revenue Act
of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-562, § 710, 45 Stat. 791, 882. The current review
threshold of $2,000,000 was set by section 305 of the Community Renewal Tax
Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 305, 114 Stat 2763, 2763A-634.
315. I.R.C. § 6045(a). The statute also requires that the report include the
“decision of the Secretary,” but this provision seems superfluous because there
would be no refund to trigger the reporting requirement unless the Secretary
had determined to pay the refund claim.
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personnel within the IRS and submitted to the Joint Committee. The report is then reviewed by staff attorneys working under the supervision of the Joint Committee’s Chief of Staff.316 If
no problems appear on the face of the report, the Joint Committee notifies the IRS that it has no objection to payment of the
refund.317
Whether the Joint Committee plays a sufficiently active
role in reviewing tax refunds and whether it even has any actual authority has been debated periodically in Congress since
shortly after the Committee’s inception.318 It is safe to say,
however, that for decades Joint Committee review has served
no meaningful limiting function with respect to the payment of
refunds.319 This Article proposes that the Joint Committee be
involved in assessing the viability of equity cases. When presented with a report from the IRS regarding a refund claim in
excess of $2 million that arises in connection with earningsinflation activity by the taxpayer, the Joint Committee would
evaluate the applicability of the various equitable defenses
316. The Joint Committee staff is responsible for a number of other activities, including assisting members of Congress in preparing bills for introduction, facilitating Ways and Means Committee and Finance Committee markups of tax legislation, and drafting the explanation of legislation contained in
the reports of the Ways and Means, Finance and Conference Committees. See
Donald L. Korb et al., Rethinking Refund Review: Understanding the Joint
Committee on Taxation, CORP. BUS. TAX’N MONTHLY, Nov. 2002, at 3, 4.
317. Note that § 6405(a) does not specifically grant the Joint Committee
veto power over the payment of large refunds; it merely requires a thirty-day
delay period. As a practical matter, however, the IRS will not generally issue
such refunds without Joint Committee approval. See Diana Lisa Erbsen, The
Joint Tax Committee Refund Review Function: Is It ‘Worth a Damn’?, 72 TAX
NOTES 227, 230–31 (1996). The grant of veto authority to the Committee has
been proposed. Id. at 228 n.15. However, a Joint Committee power to approve
or disapprove the issuance of refunds would create a legislative veto over executive branch action in violation of the Constitution. See INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding that congressional veto of an executive branch
decision to suspend the deportation of an alien constituted legislative action
that required approval of both houses of Congress and presentation to the
president).
318. The initial efforts of the Joint Committee to review large refunds were
unimpressive and were the subject of a heated floor debate in the House on
January 5, 1929. See Erbsen, supra note 317, at 229–30. Clearly, the Joint
Committee could play a meaningful role in limiting refunds. However, as a
practical matter, the IRS will not issue large refunds without Joint Committee
approval, notwithstanding the absence of an absolute Joint Committee veto.
Id.
319. Id. (noting that procedures followed by the contemporary Joint Committee do not vary significantly from the procedures that were criticized in the
1920s).
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based on the conduct of the taxpayer and advise the IRS in appropriate cases to deny the refund claim on such grounds. Importing the consideration of equitable defenses into the rather
perfunctory Joint Committee review would perhaps provide the
impetus for an expanded role for the Joint Committee staff in
this area.
CONCLUSION
It is not yet clear whether congressional and SEC responses will stem the tide of earnings inflation by U.S. corporations, but it is quite possible that earnings inflation may be a
persistent phenomenon that has simply been highlighted by the
recent weakness in the economy.320 To the extent that earnings
inflation persists, it will continue to pose problems for the tax
system because of the utility of fraudulent tax reporting in concealing accounting fraud.
Like all tax fraud, overstatement of taxable income creates
additional administrative burdens for the IRS and Treasury.
Once fraud on a tax return is discovered, the IRS must be especially diligent in its investigation because the taxpayer has
demonstrated a propensity toward dishonesty and falsehood. In
particular, fraud cases involve a greater likelihood that, in addition to the tax return, the taxpayer’s underlying records have
also been falsified. Where income has been overstated by the
taxpayer, there is a concern that the overstatement may conceal falsely inflated deductions. Tax fraud also makes it more
difficult for the IRS to determine the tax liability of other persons whose income, deductions or credits are in some way related to the taxpayer. Perhaps most importantly, tax fraud
tends to undermine the integrity of the tax system. Where
fraud is common, the government cannot be confident that the
records and returns upon which tax liabilities, and therefore
government revenues, are based are truthful and accurate. Unpunished tax fraud, in turn, tends to discourage the voluntary
compliance upon which the tax system relies. Thus, penalizing
tax fraud where there is an overstatement of income or an
overpayment of tax is supported by substantial policy considerations.

320. See Eduardo Porter, More Corporate Crime, or Just Prosecutions?,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at WK12.
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Given these policy considerations, it is unconscionable that
a taxpayer should not only avoid significant penalties, but also
readily receive a refund of taxes in excess of what was really
owed along with interest on the overpayment. Unfortunately,
that is exactly the way the current system works. The use of
equity to deny refunds in such cases, as proposed in this Article, would serve as a meaningful penalty where no penalty of
substance presently exists. A penalty imposed by equity is consistent with the growing consensus that standards, as opposed
to rules, may be more effective in dealing with tax fraud. Recent attempts to codify the economic substance doctrine first
articulated in Knetsch in 1969, attest to the perceived, continued usefulness of overarching standards to fill the inevitable
gaps created by legal rules.321 Nor would equity in this context
do undue injury to innocent shareholders, given general agency
principles, notions of shareholder risk, and risk management.
Compared to the present system, the penalty imposed by equity
would much more closely approach optimality in terms of the
government’s stated criteria of deterrent effect, encouragement
of voluntary compliance, perceived fairness and proportionality,
and efficiency and effectiveness of administration.322
Based on these considerations, the IRS should begin to
move in the direction suggested by this Article by identifying
earnings-inflation-related tax-refund claims. This step in the
process will be fortuitously aided by the newly revised Schedule
M-3 to the corporate tax return, which will provide the IRS
with previously unavailable information to link tax fraud to
earnings inflation. The IRS should include in its tax-refund reports to the Joint Committee a summary of any fraudulent activity engaged in by the taxpayer, and its relationship to the
tax fraud. For its part, the Joint Committee should evaluate
large refund claims in light of equitable principles and recommend that the IRS deny refund claims in appropriate circumstances.

321. See supra notes 266–77 and accompanying text.
322. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 31.

